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PROSECUTORS WHO DISCLOSE PROSECUTORIAL
INFORMATION FOR LITERARY OR MEDIA
PURPOSES: WHAT ABOUT THE DUTY OF
CONFIDENTIALITY?
RITA M. GLAVIN*
INTRODUCTION
The infiltration of television cameras into the courtroom, the fixa-
tion of the national media on high-profile prosecutions, and the pub-
lic's insatiable appetite for the inside story on sensational criminal
trials have created enormous temptations for the attorneys involved in
such cases to "tell all" once the matter is closed. Apart from the
money and fame such post-trial ventures as books and television mov-
ies can provide, attorneys who relay their behind-the-scenes accounts
of famous cases certainly enhance public understanding of the Ameri-
can justice system. Indeed, many defense attorneys and prosecutors
involved in heavily publicized criminal cases have detailed their roles
in publications following representation.'
* I am grateful to Professors Bruce A. Green and Russell Pearce for their inval-
uable assistance throughout the writing of this Note. I would also like to thank the
Stein Scholars Program for providing the academic climate in which I was able to
explore these issues of legal ethics.
1. For example, defense attorney Alan Dershowitz chronicled the behind-the-
scenes events of his successful appeal of Claus von Bulow's murder conviction. See
State v. von Bulow, 475 A.2d 995 (R.I.), cerL denied, 469 U.S. 875 (1984). The book
was later turned into a popular movie of the same title. Alan M. Dershowitz, Reversal
of Fortune: Inside the von Bulow Case (1986). Claus von Bulow even appeared with
Dershowitz on several radio and television shows to promote the book. See von Bu-
low v. von Bulow, 828 F.2d 94, 100-01 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that where a client
allowed publication of confidential communications in his attorney's book and joined
his attorney in promoting the book on radio and television shows, the client waived
the attorney-client privilege).
Jeffrey Toobin, who served as an associate counsel to Independent Counsel Law-
rence Walsh, published a book chronicling the investigation and trial of Lt. Colonel
Oliver North for his role in the Iran-Contra affair. Jeffrey Toobin, Opening Argu-
ments: A Young Lawyer's First Case: United States v. Oliver North (1991).
Leon Jaworski published books on two high-profile cases in which he served as lead
prosecutor. In his first book, Jaworski discussed his observations and role as a prose-
cutor in the Nazi war crimes trials. Leon Jaworski, After Fifteen Years (1961). His
second publication provided a detailed account of his experiences as the Watergate
Special Prosecutor. Leon Jaworksi, The Right and the Power The Prosecution of
Watergate (1976).
Mario Merola, the District Attorney of Bronx County in New York for 15 years,
published Big City D.A., which chronicled the investigation and prosecution of his
most notorious cases, including the Son of Sam affair and the reindictment of former
Secretary of Labor Raymond Donovan for alleged organized crime involvement.
Mario Merola, Big City D.A. (1988).
Brooklyn District Attorney Charles Hynes authored a book detailing the investiga-
tion and trial of an explosive murder case handled by his office. Charles J. Hynes &
Bob Drury, Incident at Howard Beach: The Case for Murder (1990).
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Yet, when contemplating such post-trial publications, attorneys
must consider the ethics rules that define a lawyer's duty of confiden-
tiality and thus may limit an attorney's ability to speak about a case.2
Both the Model Rules of Professional Conduct3 and the Model Code
of Professional Responsibility,' at least one of which is adopted in
forty-nine states, prohibit the disclosure of information relating to
representation without client consent. Model Rule 1.6(a) forbids the
release of "information relating to representation of a client unless the
client consents after consultation."7 Likewise, DR 4-101(B) of the
Code provides that a lawyer may not reveal a confidence or secret of
Vincent Bugliosi, who gained national fame as the prosecutor of Charles Manson,
chronicled the investigation and prosecution of the case in the well-known book
Helter Skelter. Vincent Bugliosi & Curt Gentry, Helter Skelter: The True Story of the
Manson Murders (1974). Like Dershowitz's Reversal of Fortune, this book was later
turned into a movie of the same title.
David Heibroner, a former assistant district attorney in the New York County Dis-
trict Attorney's office, authored The Days and Nights of a Young D.A., which high-
lighted his experiences during his three years at the office. David Heibroner, The
Days and Nights of a Young D.A. (1990).
Alice Vachss, former chief of the Special Victims Bureau in the Queens County
District Attorney's office wrote a book that described the prosecutions of sex crimes
and how the justice system treats the victims. Alice Vachss, Sex Crimes (1993).
2. This Note focuses solely on the ethical issues implicated when an attorney
wishes to make such a disclosure. This Note does not address first amendment impli-
cations. For a discussion on the first amendment and attorney speech, see, e.g., Re-
port of the Committee on Professional Responsibility, Association of the Bar of the
City of New York, The Need For Fair Trial Does Not Justify A Disciplinary Rule That
Broadly Restricts An Attorney's Speech, 20 Fordham Urb. LJ. 881, 886-88 (1993) (ar-
guing that ethics rules restricting attorney speech during a criminal trial should be
modified to more closely comport with the first amendment and a recent Supreme
Court decision regarding the first amendment); Scott M. Matheson, Jr., The Prosecu-
tor, The Press, and Free Speech, 58 Fordham L. Rev. 865, 930 (1990) (arguing that
"prosecutor speech is entitled to first amendment protection because the prosecutor
retains a constitutional right to self-expression and because the speech informs the
public about matters of public concern"); Fred. C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidential-
ity, 74 Iowa L. Rev. 351, 354 (1989) (stating that "[fJorbidding lawyers to disclose
information they feel morally obligated to reveal implicates serious free speech
interests").
3. Model Rules of Professional Conduct (1983) [hereinafter Model Rules].
4. Model Code of Professional Responsibility (1980) [hereinafter Code].
5. Every state but California has adopted either the Model Rules or the Code
with some minor variation. See Thomas D. Morgan & Ronald D. Rotunda, 1994 Se-
lected Standards on Professional Responsibility 129-35 (1994). California developed
its own specific code: California Business and Professions Code. lId at 306-31.
6. The American Bar Association originally adopted the Code in 1969, and sub-
sequent amendments were made to it every year between 1974 and 1980. See Charles
W. Wolfram, Modem Legal Ethics 56-57 (1986). Due to controversy over some of the
Code's amendments, the practical applicability of the Code, and alleged deficiencies
in the Code's provisions, the ABA appointed a committee to redraft the Code in
1977. I at 60-61. The product of that committee was the first draft of what is now
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Id. The ABA adopted the Model Rules in
1983 to replace the Code, though many states still abide by the Code rather than the
Model Rules. Id. at 62-63.
7. Model Rules, supra note 3, Rule 1.6(a).
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his client "for the advantage of himself or of a third person, unless the
client consents after full disclosure."8 Not only does the violation of
an ethics rule expose an attorney to disciplinary action with sanctions
ranging from private reprimand to disbarment,9 but such violations
are detrimental to the legal profession.10 Thus, the attorney must
comply with these ethics rules and obtain the client's consent to dis-
close any information relating to representation prior to writing a
book or signing a movie contract about a case. It is at this stage that
prosecutors are confronted with a unique dilemma.
Because private attorneys have a readily identifiable client who can
consent to disclosure, they can comply with these confidentiality rules
by obtaining the client's consent before revealing any representational
information." Even attorneys who represent government agencies
8. Code, supra note 4, DR 4-101(B)(3). The Code contains Canons, Ethical Con-
siderations ("ECs"), and Disciplinary Rules ("DRs"). See Code, supra note 4, Prelim-
inary Statement. Their purposes are as follows:
The Canons are statements of axiomatic norms, expressing in general terms
the standards of professional conduct expected of lawyers in their relation-
ships with the public, with the legal system, and with the legal profession.
They embody the general concepts from which the Ethical Considerations
and the Disciplinary Rules are derived.
The Ethical Considerations are aspirational in character and represent the
objectives toward which every member of the profession should strive....
The Disciplinary Rules... are mandatory in character. [They] state the
minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer can fall without being sub-
ject to disciplinary action.
Id.
9. Wolfram, supra note 6, at 85.
10. The Preamble to the Model Rules states:
The (legal) profession has a responsibility to assure that its regulations are
conceived in the public interest and not in furtherance of parochial or self-
interested concerns of the bar. Every lawyer is responsible for observance of
the Rules of Professional Conduct. A lawyer should also aid in securing
their observance by other lawyers. Neglect of these responsibilities com-
promises the independence of the profession and the public interest which it
serves.
Model Rules, supra note 3, Preamble-
11. Claus von Bulow not only allowed his attorney, Alan Dershowitz, to write a
book about his case and reveal confidential communications, but he also appeared
with Dershowitz on several television and radio shows after the book's release to
promote it. See von Bulow v. von Bulow, 828 F2d 94, 96 (2d Cir. 1987) ("After the
book was released, von Bulow and attorney Dershowitz appeared on several televi-
sion and radio shows to promote it."). As a result, the court found that von Bulow
had "consented to his attorney's disclosure of his confidences and effectively waived
his attorney-client privilege." Id. at 101.
In United States v. Hearst, 638 F.2d 1190, 1192 (9th Cir. 1980), aff'g 466 F. Supp.
1068 (N.D. Cal. 1978), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 938 (1981), defense attorney F. Lee Bai-
ley obtained the consent of his client, Patty Hearst, to write a book about her trial and
life story. Hearst had been arrested and convicted for armed bank robbery. Id. at
1191.
Throughout this Note, "representational information" refers to information that an
attorney learns in the course of representation and is protected by Model Rule 1.6
and DR 4-101.
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and officials in civil suits have a client from whom to obtain consent
to comply with confidentiality rules when revealing representational
information.' 2 Because the prosecutor's well-recognized client, how-
ever, is the public, 13 it is unclear who, if anyone, provides client con-
sent to prosecutors who wish to disclose confidences for literary or
media works. The ethics rules are devoid of advice as to who decides
if and when a prosecutor may reveal representational information in
such instances. A prosecutor's duty of confidentiality is not even
mentioned in the ABA Standards Relating to the Administration of
Criminal Justice,' 4 which are meant to provide more specific guidance
to prosecutors for the unique situations confronting them that are not
adequately addressed by the Code or Model Rules. The only limita-
tion the ABA Prosecution Standards place upon prosecutors is found
12. A federal agency qualifies as a client and is protected by the attorney-client
privilege. See Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Department of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 863
(D.C. Cir. 1980) (recognizing that there are cases where "the Government is dealing
with its attorneys as would any private party seeking advice to protect personal inter-
ests, and needs the same assurance of confidentiality so it will not be deterred from
full and frank communications with its counselors"); Towns of Norfolk and Walpole v.
United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 137 F.R.D. 183, 190 (D. Mass. 1991) (holding
that the Corps is the client of the Department of Justice), aff'd sub nom. Town of
Norfolk v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 968 F.2d 1438 (1st Cir. 1992); United
States v. AT&T, 86 F.R.D. 603, 617 (D.D.C. 1979) (holding that while the identity of
the government attorney's client is unclear, it "clearly includes the attorney's own
agency"); Thill Sec. Corp. v. New York Stock Exch., 57 F.R.D. 133, 138-39 (E.D. Wis.
1972) (finding that an attorney-client relationship existed between the Antitrust Divi-
sion of the Justice Department and the SEC); see also Major Michael J. Davidson, Yes
Virginia, There Is a Federal Agency Attorney-Client Privilege, 41 Fed. B. News & J. 51
(1994) (arguing that just as a corporation has client status, so does a federal agency);
Lory A. Barsdate, Note, Attorney-Client Privilege for the Government Entity, 97 Yale
L.J. 1725, 1733 (1988) ("Like corporations, government agencies are entity 'clients'
that seek legal advice and are parties to litigation."). Because a government agency
has an attorney-client privilege, it follows that the attorney owes the agency a duty of
confidentiality, and only the agency may waive that duty. For purposes of ethics rules
pertaining to confidentiality, the officers of the agency are the individuals who may
waive that duty. See Professional Ethics Committee, Federal Bar Association, The
Government Client and Confidentiality: Opinion 73-1, 32 Fed. B.J. 71, 72 (1973) (stat-
ing that the client of the government lawyer, for purposes of confidentiality, "is the
agency where he is employed, including those charged with its administration insofar
as they are engaged in the conduct of the public business").
13. See infra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
14. With regard to the purpose of these specific standards, Standard 3-1.1
provides:
These standards are intended to be used as a guide to professional conduct
and performance. They are not intended to be used as criteria for the judi-
cial evaluation of alleged misconduct of the prosecutor to determine the va-
lidity of a conviction. They may or may not be relevant in such judicial
evaluation, depending upon all the circumstances.
ABA Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice Standard 3-1.1
(1992) [hereinafter ABA Prosecution Standards]. These standards are merely for the
consideration of criminal lawyers in cases where they seek more specific guidance.
Unlike the Code and Model Rules, under which an attorney's conduct may be judi-
cially evaluated, these standards were never intended to hold such weight-only to
provide additional guidance if needed.
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in Standard 3-2.11, which states that "prior to conclusion of all aspects
of a matter,"'15 a prosecutor should not "enter into any agreement or
understanding by which the prosecutor acquires an interest in literary
or media rights to a portrayal or account based in substantial part on
information relating to that matter." 6 Are prosecutors exempt from
ethics rules requiring attorneys not to reveal confidences without cli-
ent consent? After representation, does a prosecutor have unlimited
authority to write a book about the case and to reveal information
obtained in the course of representation? 17
This issue recently arose when a former associate counsel to In-
dependent Counsel 8 Lawrence Walsh wrote a book providing an in-
side account of Walsh's highly publicized investigation of the Iran-
Contra scandal and prosecution of Lt. Colonel Oliver North.' 9 The
associate, Jeffrey Toobin, wrote the book despite Walsh's objections,2
and it was published prior to North's appeal.2' The publication re-
vealed nonpublic office discussions, memos, and strategies in the
case.2 Because the account disclosed the inner workings of the office
15. ABA Prosecution Standards, supra note 14, Standard 3-2.11.
16. 1l
17. There is a difference between general information and specific information
learned in the course of representation. This Note is concerned with prosecutorial
disclosures of specific information about a case. General information is the knowl-
edge about how an office works and handles certain cases that all lawyers gain from
their employers. For instance, a former prosecutor who took part in over 20 murder
cases would not be precluded from representing a defendant accused of murder sim-
ply because he will use his knowledge and experience gained from his previous em-
ployer to defend the accused. Comparatively, if the former prosecutor had played
some role, however minimal, in the investigation of his client before leaving the pros-
ecutor's office, he would be precluded from representing the client because the attor-
ney would have specific information about the case obtained from his former
employment. This distinction is also true with respect to prosecutors who want to
disclose representational information for literary or media purposes. A prosecutor
does not breach the duty of confidentiality by writing a mystery novel about a murder
if he draws on his general knowledge and experience regarding murder investigations
in telling the story. It is when the prosecutor wishes to disclose specific information
about specific cases that the confidentiality rule is triggered. This is the issue ad-
dressed by this Note.
18. See infra notes 130-31 and accompanying text (discussing the appointment and
purpose of an independent counsel).
19. Toobin, supra note 1.
20. Penguin Books USA Inc. v. Walsh, 756 F. Supp. 770, 774-75 (S.D.N.Y.), va-
cated as moot, 929 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1991).
21. 929 F.2d at 69-70.
22. 756 F. Supp. at 773. For example, one passage from Toobin's book states:
It was a February morning in the New York office when Struve handed me a
three-page memorandum. "We're trying not to make too many copies of
this," he said, "so please give it back when you're finished looking it over."
I think my eyes might literally have bulged when I saw the title: "Outline
of Potential Charges."..... The memo listed the "more likely charges" the
OIC was considering bringing, and it began with "Conduct of Covert Hostili-
ties in Nicaragua." This first category was described as the "use of United
States government funds and assets ... to carry on covert hostilities in Nica-
ragua after the Boland Amendment prohibited such expenditures"-the Bo-
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and many office confidences, Walsh took the author to court to pre-
vent release of the book.23 One argument he advanced was that the
associate violated DR 4-101(B) by revealing, without consent, infor-
mation learned in the course of representation.' The district court
held that an alleged violation of a disciplinary rule does not generate a
cause of action.2- Rather, a disciplinary violation must be brought
before the proper disciplinary body for action against an attorney.26
The publisher released the book prior to Walsh's appeal, and the re-
lease rendered the subsequent appeal moot.27 To date, there is no
public record of disciplinary proceedings brought against Toobin.
The issues raised by Walsh demonstrate the grave interests impli-
cated when prosecutors disclose representational information for liter-
ary or media purposes. Prosecutors have greater access to
information than does perhaps any other attorney. They have access
to law enforcement personnel, witnesses, the government's evidence,28
social service agencies, and interested citizens. If prosecutors were
free to disclose such information indiscriminately, the prosecution
function might be jeopardized: pending investigations and cases could
be prejudiced," the reputations of innocent parties might be irrepara-
bly damaged 3 a relationship of trust between prosecutors within the
office could break down,31 and the physical safety of others might be
endangered.32 Rather than conducting cases to seek justice,33 prose-
cutors might make decisions in a prosecution that would maximize the
land or "one-A" case, as we came to call it, in reference to its position on
Struve's memo. The next crime the memo listed was "Use of Tax-Exempt
Foundations to Fund Covert Hostilities in Nicaragua," followed by "Diver-
sion of Proceeds of Iranian Arms Transactions." The list was rounded out
with "Personal Enrichment" and "Obstruction of Justice."
Toobin, supra note 1, at 34-35.
23. 756 F. Supp. at 772.
24. Id at 783. Walsh raised two other arguments, in addition to an alleged viola-
tion of DR 4-101(B), to prevent the release of the book. Those arguments were: (1)
that Toobin violated several regulations forbidding the disclosure of nonpublic infor-
mation relating to the work of the Office of Independent Counsel ("OIC") without
OIC authorization and (2) that Toobin breached his fiduciary and contractual obliga-
tions to the OIC because he signed a Non-Disclosure Agreement when he left the
employ of the OIC. Id. at 783-86. The court ruled against Walsh on every point. Id. at
783-88.
25. Id at 783.
26. Id In this case, the court held that "[t]he proper forum for such a complaint is
... the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, which is
authorized to deal with such matters [under New York law]." Id.
27. 929 F.2d 69, 74 (2d Cir. 1991) (vacating the district court opinion as moot be-
cause the book at issue had been released by the time of the appeal).
28. See infra note 194 and accompanying text.
29. See discussion infra part II.B.
30. Id
31. Idt
32. I
33. See infra note 63 and accompanying text.
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publication value of the account after representation.3 The poten-
tially devastating effects of such disclosures by prosecutors demand
more specific ethical guidance on a prosecutor's ability to disclose rep-
resentational information.
This Note argues that prosecutors wishing to disclose information
learned in the course of representation for literary or media purposes
are subject to the same ethics rules governing confidentiality as are
other lawyers. Because those rules require client consent for disclo-
sure but are silent on who provides consent to a prosecutor, this Note
proposes an ethical standard for inclusion in the ABA Prosecution
Standards, which focus specifically on prosecutors.3 5 The proposed
standard provides a process by which a prosecutor may obtain permis-
sion to reveal information learned in the course of representation.
Additionally, the standard specifies what factors a decision maker
should consider when entertaining such a request for disclosure. Both
this Note and the proposed standard recognize the importance of ethi-
cal limitations on an attorney's ability to disclose representational in-
formation and seek to remedy the fact that the current ethical rules do
not fit the prosecutor's role.
Part I examines the prosecutor's duty of confidentiality. This part
focuses on his unique position with regard to that duty-because the
public is his client-and the extent to which the prosecutor may reveal
information learned in the course of representation.
Part II argues that a prosecutor's authority to disclose representa-
tional information is limited to the prosecutorial context. This part
argues further that prosecutors who wish to disclose information
learned in the course of employment for literary or media purposes
may not do so without consent from the chief prosecutor, because the
disclosure is outside the context of a pending prosecution. Part II also
addresses the situation where a chief prosecutor wants to make a dis-
closure for media or literary purposes. Reasoning that the chief pros-
ecutor cannot objectively decide whether to allow the disclosure when
he has a personal interest in the decision, this part concludes that he
must delegate the decision to an impartial decision maker.
Part III sets out certain considerations that must guide a decision to
allow such disclosures for literary or media works. Those considera-
tions derive from an examination of the special purposes of the duty
of confidentiality as it pertains to the prosecutor, in light of the public
interest in knowing how prosecutors perform their public duties.
Part IV proposes an ethical standard to be included in the ABA
Prosecution Standards. The proposed standard identifies the proper
decision maker to authorize a prosecutorial disclosure for literary or
34. See discussion infra part IIA.
35. See supra note 14.
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media purposes and the factors that the decision maker should con-
sider when entertaining such a disclosure request.
This Note concludes that the proposed standard will provide an or-
derly process by which prosecutors can obtain permission to reveal
representational confidences for literary or media works, whereby the
public interest in knowing about a criminal case and the need for con-
fidentiality in a prosecutor's office are adequately balanced. This
standard will guide prosecutors where current ethics rules are silent
and will help to minimize the potential for compromising the integrity
of the prosecutorial function.
I. Ti PROSECUTOR'S UNIQUE POSITION AND THE DUTY OF
CONFIDENTIALITY
The attorney-client privilege and the ethical duty of confidentiality
serve to protect information an attorney learns during representa-
tion.36 This part first distinguishes the ethical duty of confidentiality
from the attorney-client privilege to demonstrate that the ethical obli-
gation is much broader than the evidentiary privilege. It then dis-
cusses the applicability of the confidentiality rules to prosecutors and
argues that prosecutors must abide by the ethical duty of confidential-
ity. Because both the Code and Model Rules provisions pertaining to
confidentiality require client consent before an attorney may disclose
representational information, they fail to address the special concerns
of prosecutors, who have difficulty complying with these provisions.
A. Distinguishing the Ethical Duty of Confidentiality from the
Attorney-Client Privilege
The ethical obligation to maintain confidences gained in the profes-
sional relationship is distinct from the attorney-client privilege. The
attorney-client privilege extends only to a client's confidential com-
munications made to his attorney during legal representation for the
purpose of seeking legal advice.37 Under that privilege, disclosure
cannot be compelled and all such communications are inadmissible in
36. See Model Rules, supra note 3, Rule 1.6 cmt. (discussing an attorney's confi-
dentiality obligations, as embodied in the attorney-client privilege and ethical duty of
confidentiality, and their necessity in encouraging clients to communicate with their
attorneys).
37. See 8 Wigmore, Evidence §§ 2291-92 (3d ed. 1940). Wigmore summarized the
privilege in the following terms:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal
adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that pur-
pose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance perma-
nently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor, (8)
except the protection be waived.
Id. § 2292 (emphasis omitted).
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court.3" The broader ethical duty of confidentiality, "unlike the evi-
dentiary privilege, exists without regard to the nature or source of in-
formation or the fact that others share the knowledge."3 9 The Model
Rules specify that "[tihe confidentiality rule applies not merely to
matters communicated in confidence by the client but also to all infor-
mation relating to the representation, whatever its source."'" Conse-
quently, an attorney has an ethical duty not to reveal any information
learned in the course of representation, regardless of whether the cli-
ent communicated it to him, whether the information may already
be b]known by other people, or whether the information is not
confidential.
The attorney-client privilege is inapplicable to the prosecutor be-
cause no particular client reveals information to him for the purpose
of obtaining legal advice. By contrast, the broader ethical obligation
not to reveal representational information without client consent ap-
plies to the prosecutor with full force because that duty attaches to
any communication "acquired in the course of his professional
employment.""1
B. The Duty of Confidentiality As Applied to Prosecutors
The notion that prosecutors must abide by ethics rules, including
the duty of confidentiality, is obvious from the language of the Code
and Model Rules and is accepted by the National District Attorneys
38. Id. If the client waives the privilege, then such communications can be used in
court. I&
39. Code, supra note 4, EC 4-4. Additionally, in contrast to confidences protected
by the attorney-client evidentiary privilege, a lawyer may have to divulge informa-
tion protected by the ethical duty of confidentiality when required by law or a court
order requires it. See id. DR 4-101(C)(2) (indicating that a lawyer may disclose
"[c]onfidences or secrets when permitted under Disciplinary Rules or required by law
or court order"). So, unlike the attorney-client privilege, information protected by
the duty of confidentiality may be divulged and is admissible in court under certain
conditions.
40. Model Rules, supra note 3, Rule 1.6 cmt.; see also Code, supra note 4, EC 4-5
("A lawyer should not use information acquired in the course of the representation of
a client to the disadvantage of the client and a lawyer should not use, except with the
consent of his client after full disclosure, such information for his own purposes.").
41. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 202
(1940). This opinion interprets Canon 37 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics
(1908), which was the precursor to the Code. See Canon 37, in Morgan & Rotunda,
supra note 5, at 593 ("It is the duty of a lawyer to preserve his client's confidences...
[a lawyer] should [not] accept employment which involves or may involve the disclo-
sure ... of these confidences ... without [the client's] knowledge and consent, and
even though there are other available sources of such information."). The Canons
were applied until the adoption of the Code in 1970. Id. at 583 (annotation). DR 4-
101 supplanted Canon 37, which originally governed client confidences. DR 4-101
specifically refers to Canon 37 as authority in footnotes throughout the Ethical Con-
siderations for DR 4-101. In fact, DR 4-101 refers both to ABA Canon 37 and to
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility Formal Op. 202 as interpreta-
tive authority for the Disciplinary Rule. See Code, supra note 4, Canon 4 nn.6-8, 10,
14, 17, 19.
1995] 1817
1818 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63
Association.4' The Preliminary Statement to the Code announces that
"the Disciplinary Rules should be uniformly applied to all lawyers,
regardless of the nature of their professional activities."43 Neither the
Code nor the Model Rules make any exception for prosecutors. In-
deed, the Model Rules state that "[t]he requirement of maintaining
confidentiality of information relating to representation applies to
government lawyers."" Additionally, the National District Attorneys
Association declares that "[t]he prosecutor's obligation to comply
with the ethical code and rules of his jurisdiction is a fundamental and
minimal requirement."45 Thus, prosecutors must comply with the
Code and Model Rules.46
42. The National District Attorneys Association is "the national service organiza-
tion for all prosecutors throughout the country." National Prosecution Standards i
(Nat'l District Att'ys Ass'n 1st ed. 1977).
43. Code, supra note 4, Preliminary Statement (footnotes omitted).
44. Model Rules, supra note 3, Rule 1.6 cmt.
In addition, the general law of agency, which served as a source for the confidential-
ity rules in the Code and Model Rules, prohibits lawyers-as agents-from revealing
information learned during the course of representation. See Wolfram, supra note ,
at 299. The Restatement of Agency states that an agent has a duty not to reveal
information given to him "during the course of or on account of his agency ...
although such information does not relate to the transaction in which he is then em-
ployed, unless the information is a matter of general knowledge." Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Agency § 395 (1957). The Restatement further provides that "[u]nless other
wise agreed, after the termination of the agency," the agent has a duty "not to use or
to disclose to third persons ... confidential matters given to him only for the princi-
pal's use or acquired by the agent in violation of that duty". Id. § 396(b). The Com-
ment to § 396 specifically states that this agency duty applies to attorneys. Id. § 396
cnt. e. Thus, even without the Code and Model Rules, prosecutors are still subject to
agency law and may not reveal any information learned in the course of representa-
tion in the absence of consent.
45. National Prosecution Standards § 6 commentary at 21 (Nat'l District Attor-
neys Ass'n 2d. ed. 1991); see also id. § 6.2. The National Prosecution Standards are
"standards written for prosecutors by prosecutors." National Prosecution Standards
at 1. The National District Attorneys Association ("NDAA") promulgated the
standards
to address the problems of the prosecution function ....
.... While each standard is viewed by NDAA as a necessary part of an
optimal system of justice, it is not the intent of NDAA that these standards
serve in any way as a basis to sanction a prosecutor who has deemed it more
appropriate to vary his practice from the standards.
Id. at 3-5. The NDAA urges "the adoption of the concepts found in the standards by
all reasonable methods." Id. at 7.
46. Not only must a prosecutor abide by professional ethics rules, but he is held to
a higher standard of professional conduct than are other attorneys. The Code and
Model Rules give public prosecutors additional ethical obligations, rather than excep-
tions. For example, DR 7-103(A) prohibits a public prosecutor from instituting
charges not supported by probable cause. Code, supra note 4, DR 7-103(A). Model
Rule 3.8 delineates the "Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor," which include,
among others, making reasonable efforts to assure that the accused has been advised
of his right to counsel and not seeking to obtain a waiver of pretrial rights from an
unrepresented defendant. Model Rules, supra note 3, Rule 3.8. In addition, the court
in United States v. Judge not only stated that "prosecuting attorneys [are]... expected
DUTY OF CONFIDENTIALITY
Opinions of professional ethics committees specifically support the
notion that prosecutors must abide by confidentiality rules. The ABA
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility states that DR
4-101(B), which forbids a lawyer from revealing confidences, "applies
to a government lawyer as well as to private practitioners." '47 The
Committee on Professional Ethics of the New York State Bar Associ-
ation also opined on this issue when an assistant district attorney who
prosecuted a highly publicized criminal case inquired as to whether
she could sell her media rights to the case and assist in the develop-
ment of her character for a screenplay.' The Committee stated that
while it "[knew] of no reason under the Code... why an assistant
district attorney may not sell her life rights with respect to the subject
matter of a completed representation," the prosecutor must follow
certain safeguards and "must be certain to continue to protect the
confidences and secrets of the client."4 9 Relying on DR 4-101(B), the
Committee made clear that prosecutors have a duty of confidentiality
that "exists without regard to whether others share the information or
whether it is part of the public record or available from another
source . . . [and the duty] survives the termination of the
representation. 5 °
Courts also widely accept the principle that prosecutors must abide
by the confidentiality rules in the Code and Model Rules. For exam-
ple, in United States v. Ostrer,1 the court disqualified a former federal
prosecutor from representing a defendant in a matter on which he
worked during his tenure as prosecutor.52 The court specifically ap-
plied DR 4-101(B) to the former prosecutor in holding that a "danger
exist[ed] that the [former prosecutor] may breach a confidence by di-
vulging or unfairly utilizing information obtained in the course of his
former employment" in violation of Canon 4 of the Code.53 In United
States v. Uzzi,I the court applied Canon 4 to a prosecutor and dis-
qualified the law firm of a former assistant United States Attorney
from representing a defendant in a case in which the former assistant
to uphold the standards of the general profession," but also found that prosecutors
are "held to standards of conduct more stringent than those applied to private law-
yers." 625 F. Supp. 901, 902 (D. Haw. 1986); see also Stewart v. United States Postal
Serv., 649 F. Supp. 1531, 1534 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (stating that "a prosecutor... is held
to a higher [ethical] standard than a private advocate").
47. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 342
(1975).
48. New York State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 606 (1990).
49. Id
50. Id.
51. 597 F.2d 337 (2d Cir. 1979). In Ostrer, the former prosecutor had participated
in criminal investigations and prosecutions closely related to the case on which he was
currently employed as a defense attorney. Id. at 338-39.
52. Id
53. Id at 340. Canon 4 requires a lawyer to preserve the confidences and secrets
of his client. Code, supra note 4, Canon 4.
54. 549 F. Supp. 979 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
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prosecutor played a minimal role in the investigatory phase. 55 The
court found that there was a risk that specific information that the
former prosecutor learned from his previous job might be disclosed.56
Similarly, the court in Allied Realty, Inc. v. Exchange National Bank 7
found that prosecutors were subject to ethical obligations concerning
the preservation of confidences learned in the course of representa-
tion unless the prosecutor's office consented to disclosure.58  These
cases demonstrate that prosecutors must abide by the duty of confi-
dentiality and that this duty survives the termination of government
employment.
C. The Prosecutor's Dilemma in Obtaining Consent Under
Confidentiality Rules and the Need For Prosecutorial
Discretion
Although the American Bar Association, ethics committees, and
courts apply the duty of confidentiality to prosecutors, it is unclear
exactly who the prosecutor should consider his client for purposes of
obtaining consent to disclose under the Code and Model Rules.
Model Rule 1.6(a) and DR 4-101(B)(3) both prohibit disclosure of
confidences "unless the client consents. ' 59 The prosecutor's client,
however, is the public.60 He does not represent an individual client, a
victim, the police officer, a government agency, or a particular govern-
55. Id. at 982-83.
56. Id. at 984-85. The court stated that it "presumes that the attorney received
confidences and secrets based on the prior representation. This standard applies even
in criminal cases." Id. at 982 (citations omitted).
57. 283 F. Supp. 464 (D. Minn. 1968), aff'd, 408 F.2d 1099 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 823 (1969).
58. Id. at 466. Canon 37, which previously governed the preservation of secrets
and confidences obtained during representation, was held not to be an issue here
because the prosecutor's office consented to disclosure of confidential information by
the former prosecutor. Id.; see supra note 41 (discussing Canon 37); see also State v.
Martinez, 673 P.2d 509, 513-14 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that where the State
waives any breach of its confidences by a former assistant district attorney, those con-
fidences and possible disqualification of defense counsel are not an issue).
59. Model Rules, supra note 3, Rule 1.6(a); Code, supra note 4, DR 4-101(B)(3).
60. See Cal. Gov't Code § 100(b) (West 1980) ("The style of all process shall be
'The People of the State of California' and all prosecutions shall be conducted in their
name and by their authority."); New York Crim. Proc. Law § 1.20(31) (McKinney
1992) (" 'Prosecutor' means a district attorney or any other public servant who repre-
sents the people in a criminal action.") (emphasis added); see also Griffin B. Bell, The
Attorney General: The Federal Government's Chief Lawyer and Chief Litigator, or
One Among Many?, 46 Fordham L. Rev. 1049, 1069 (1978) (the former United States
Attorney General observed, "Although our client is the government, in the end we
serve a more important constituency: the American people"); Matheson, supra note
2, at 885 (stating that the prosecutor "represents the community"); Beth Nolan, Re-
moving Conflicts from the Administration of Justice: Conflicts of Interest and In-
dependent Counsels Under the Ethics in Government Act, 79 Geo. L.J. 1, 43 (1990)
(asserting that an independent counsel and a prosecutor represent the public).
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ment official. The prosecutor represents "society as a whole"'" and
the decisions he makes within his official capacity must serve the pub-
lic interest.62 As the United States Supreme Court declared, "[The
prosecutor's] interest in a criminal prosecution is not that [he] shall
win a case, but that justice shall be done. ' 63 Yet, it is impracticable for
the public to make decisions in the way an ordinary client would. One
commentator observed that for a government lawyer, the "public in-
terest or community at large... is a vague and meaningless abstrac-
tion, useless in practice. It is impossible to represent the [public]
which is always divided."'
Appreciating this dilemma, the Code delineates an exception to the
general rule for the prosecutor: EC 7-7 requires that the authority to
make decisions in the course of representation that affect the merits of
the case or may prejudice the client's rights "is exclusively that of the
client and... such decisions are binding on his lawyer."'  Those deci-
sions reserved exclusively to the client include accepting a plea or set-
tlement offer,66 proceeding to trial,6' and appealing a judgment.6
Yet, because a prosecutor does not have a client capable of making
these decisions, the Code recognizes the need for prosecutorial discre-
tion. EC 7-13 states that "the prosecutor is not only an advocate but
he also may make decisions normally made by an individual client."69
The prosecutor is thus given specific authority, by virtue of his office
and its goals, to make decisions normally reserved for the client when
such decisions are intended to advance the prosecution.
In every case, the prosecutor decides what is in the public's best
interest, because it is the people "who give over to the prosecutor the
authority to seek a just result in their name. ' 70 The prosecutor de-
61. Carol A. Corrigan, On Prosecutorial Ethics, 13 Hastings Const. LQ. 537, 537
(1986); see also National Prosecution Standards § 1 commentary at 11 (Nat'l District
Att'ys Ass'n 2d ed. 1991) (stating that "the prosecutor has a client not shared with
other members of the bar, ie., society as a whole").
62. See David M. Nissman & Ed Hagen, The Prosecution Function 10 (1982)
("[T]he prosecutor's primary loyalty is to the public he represents and whose interests
he swears to protect.").
63. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (holding that misconduct by a
United States Attorney during his cross-examination of witnesses and summation to
the jury may be so grave that, if not counteracted by the trial judge, it may require
reversal of the conviction).
64. Douglas Sale, The City Attorney's Relationship with Council and Staff. Deter-
mining Who is the Client in Day-to-Day Affairs, 11 Current Mun. Probs. 10, 11 (1984-
85).
65. Code, supra note 4, EC 7-7. The Model Rules are silent on this issue.
66. Id. EC 7-7.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. EC 7-13 (emphasis added).
70. Corrigan, supra note 61, at 539.
1995] 1821
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
cides who is to be charged and the nature of the charge,7 which of-
fenses will be prosecuted and which will be dismissed,72 and whether a
plea will be offered or accepted.73 The prosecutor has exclusive con-
trol to act for his client-the public-in a prosecution. 74
The prosecutor's ability to make client decisions includes the power
to disclose information obtained in the course of representation.
Therefore, the prohibition against revealing information learned in
the course of representation unless the client consents, as stated in
Model Rule 1.6 and DR 4-101(B), 75 is inapplicable to a prosecutor
when he discloses such information for the purpose of advancing the
prosecution. The prosecutor does not need permission under Model
Rule 1.6 or DR 4-101(B) in that situation because he is authorized to
make that "client decision" as to whether to disclose. During plea
negotiations, a prosecutor may reveal critical aspects of the prosecu-
tion's case or strategies of which the defense may be unaware to en-
courage an agreement.76 For instance, a prosecutor may disclose that
a possible witness is particularly strong under cross-examination, that
the police are presently pursuing several reliable tips as to where the
murder weapon is hidden, or that indictments of conspirators are ex-
pected within a certain amount of time.77 What is revealed and the
extent of the revelation are within the prosecutor's discretion, and
71. See Hazel B. Kerper, Introduction to the Criminal Justice System, in The Prose-
cutor in America 79, 79 (John Jay Douglass ed., 1977) ("The prosecutor makes the
decision to charge... [and] determines the nature of the charge.").
72. See id. at 80 (stating that the prosecutor "can dismiss the action once it has
been filed... [and the decision] in many jurisdictions is his alone").
73. See id. (discussing the prosecutor's discretion and his power to bargain for
pleas with the accused).
74. EC 7-13 states:
The responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from that of the usual advo-
cate ... the prosecutor represents the sovereign and therefore should use
restraint in the discretionary exercise of governmental powers, such as in the
selection of cases to prosecute; ... during trial the prosecutor is not only an
advocate but he also may make decisions normally made by an individual
client, and those affecting the public interest should be fair to all.
Code, supra note 4, EC 7-13; see also ABA Prosecution Standards, supra note 14,
Standard 3-2.1 ("The prosecution function should be performed by a public prosecu-
tor who is a lawyer subject to the standards of professional conduct and discipline.").
75. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
76. Standard 3-4.1(c) of the ABA Prosecution Standards states that "[a] prosecu-
tor should not knowingly make false statements or representations as to fact or law in
the course of plea discussions with defense counsel or the accused." ABA Prosecution
Standards, supra note 14, Standard 3-4.1(c). The very existence of this standard
makes clear that a prosecutor is allowed to make disclosures within the context of
plea discussions.
77. Other attorneys may also make these types of disclosures but are subject to
any limitations the client may place upon disclosure. The Comment to Model Rule
1.6 states:
A lawyer is impliedly authorized to make disclosures about a client when
appropriate in carrying out the representation, except to the extent that the
client's instructions or special circumstances limit that authority. In litigation,
for example, a lawyer may disclose information by admitting a fact that can-
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only internal office policies limit that discretion.78 Additional support
for the notion that prosecutors may disclose information protected by
confidentiality rules when the disclosure advances the prosecution is
found in ABA Prosecution Standards Standard 3-1.4(a), DR 7-107,
and Model Rule 3.6. Standard 3-1.4(a) prohibits a prosecutor from
making "extrajudicial statement[s]" that he knows might have a "sub-
stantial likelihood of prejudicing a criminal proceeding. ' 79 DR 7-107
and Model Rule 3.6 provide similar guidance as to what a prosecutor
may publicly disclose during a pending prosecution.' These rules im-
ply that prosecutors do have authority to disclose information in the
context of a pending prosecution. Within these confines, therefore,
the prosecutor already has some authority to reveal information
otherwise protected by Model Rule 1.6 and DR 4-101(B).
Thus, a prosecutor may disclose representational information when
the disclosure is to advance the prosecution. These rules, however, do
not authorize the disclosure of representational information for any
other purpose. Therefore, as required by DR 4-101(B) and Model
Rule 1.6, the prosecutor must obtain permission to disclose represen-
tational information for purposes unrelated to his professional du-
ties.81 From whom a prosecutor may obtain permission for such
disclosures is the issue addressed in the next part.
H. LIMrrATIONS ON A PROSECUTOR'S ABILITY TO DIscLosE
INFORMATION LEARNED IN THE COURSE OF
REPRESENTATION
The Code and Model Rules authorize a prosecutor to disclose infor-
mation learned in the course of representation to advance the prose-
cution.82 A prosecutor, however, is not authorized to disclose
representational information for purposes unrelated to his profes-
sional duties, such as for literary or media purposes, and he must ob-
not properly be disputed, or in negotiation by making a disclosure that facili-
tates a satisfactory conclusion.
Model Rules, supra note 3, Rule 1.6 cmt. (emphasis added). A prosecutor is not sub-ject to a client placing limitations upon his authority to disclose.
78. For example, federal regulations for the Department of Justice set out specific
guidelines for the release of information relating to criminal and civil proceedings. See
28 C.F.R. § 50.2 (1994). Those guidelines prohibit Department of Justice attorneys
from making public statements that include, among other things, observations about a
defendant's character or references to a defendant's refusal to submit to polygraph
tests. Id. § 502(b)(6)(i)-(vi).
79. ABA Prosecution Standards, supra note 14, Standard 3-1.4(a).
80. Code, supra note 4, DR 7-107 (addressing trial publicity and limiting the ex-
tent to which a prosecutor may make extrajudicial statements in order to prevent any
prejudice to a defendant's right to a fair trial); Model Rules, supra note 3, Rule 3.6
(same).
81. See supra notes 47-58 and accompanying text; see also discussion infra part
HA.
82. See discussion supra part I.C.
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tain consent, as required by confidentiality rules, to do so. 83 This part
asserts that to whom a prosecutor should turn for permission to dis-
close depends upon whether the prosecutor is an assistant or a chief
prosecutor.
A. The Supervisor Approach: When the Assistant Prosecutor Wants
to Write a Book
As discussed earlier, an assistant prosecutor only has the limited
authority to disclose representational information within the confines
of a prosecution.' Once he seeks to disclose for reasons unrelated to
a pending prosecution, the requirement of obtaining client consent for
disclosure under the Code and Model Rules applies, and the chief
prosecutor, as head of that office, should be the sole authority to grant
or deny this consent.'s
Requiring the chief prosecutor's consent to disclosures outside the
context of a pending prosecution complies with the cases discussed
earlier where a former prosecutor wishes to represent a defendant in a
83. See discussion supra part I.B-C.
84. See id.
85. While it can be argued that a prosecutor who wants to expose office corruption
in a book or movie production would be prevented from doing so if he needed per-
mission from his boss, these "whistleblowing" concerns are inapplicable to the release
of information for literary or media purposes. First, there are normally internal mech-
anisms if an assistant prosecutor is concerned about possible wrongdoing by his office
in a specific case. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 1212-1214 (1994) (delineating the duties of the
Office of Special Counsel, which receives and investigates allegations of government
corruption, and identifying the Office of Special Counsel as the appropriate entity for
federal employees to make reports of suspected government corruption). Second, the
purpose of "whistleblowing" is to seek an immediate remedy for wrongdoing. If a
prosecutor suspects corruption, he must report it immediately to the disciplinary com-
mittee of the office or Bar. Model Rule 8.3(a) states that "[a] lawyer having knowl-
edge that another lawyer has committed a violation of the rules of professional
conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness
or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall inform the appropriate professional au-
thority." Model Rules, supra note 3, Rule 8.3(a). Additionally, DR 1-103(A) states
that a lawyer possessing knowledge of a violation of the Code "shall report such
knowledge to a tribunal or other authority empowered to investigate or act upon such
violation." Code, supra note 4, DR 1-103(A).
Disclosing office confidences regarding office corruption for a book or movie is
contrary to Model Rule 8.3(a) and DR 1-103(A). Because books are not published
for months after they are written, a prosecutor who exposes office corruption by writ-
ing a book does nothing to redress a wrong that may have occurred months or years
earlier. The same is true for a movie. Also, a prosecutor who chooses such a forum as
a book or movie to expose wrongdoing often hurts his own credibility and the chances
for redress because has much to gain personally from the venture. Consequently, a
prosecutor who claims to write a book or aid in a movie production about a case to
expose office corruption is not "whistleblowing." But see Malcolm Bell, The Turkey
Shoot: Tracking the Attica Cover-Up (1985) (chronicling Bell's role as the special
prosecutor for the Attica prison riots and his subsequent resignation in protest be-
cause he was unable to penetrate the stonewalling of the New York State government
officials who had engaged themselves in a massive cover-up and prevented Bell from
doing his job).
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matter on which he gained specific knowledge as a prosecutor.86 Im-
plicit in the court's opinion in United States v. Ostrers7 is the notion
that once an assistant prosecutor acts for purposes other than the ad-
vancement of a criminal prosecution, he lacks the authority to reveal
confidences or divulge information obtained in the course of represen-
tation.' Similarly, Allied Realty, Inc. v. Exchange National Bank"
stands for the proposition that an assistant United States Attorney
does not have the authority to make nonprosecutorial disclosures ab-
sent consent by the United States Attorney. 9° In State v. Martinez,91
the court found that there was no breach of confidentiality by a for-
mer prosecutor representing a defendant where the district attorney's
office "waived any breach of its confidences."'
These cases, or "revolving door" scenarios-where a former prose-
cutor wishes to represent a defendant in a case in which he gained
some specific knowledge from his former employment-require assis-
tant prosecutors to obtain consent from the chief prosecutor to reveal
representational information for nonprosecutorial purposes. This
need for permission to disclose stems from the recognition that an
assistant prosecutor does not have the authority to disclose such infor-
mation beyond the confines of a pending prosecution.93 In addition to
clarifying the assistant prosecutor's limited authority to make disclo-
sures, these cases also clarify that the chief prosecutor is logically the
appropriate authority to consent to disclosures by an assistant prose-
cutor that are outside the scope of the prosecutorial function.'
An assistant prosecutor who wishes to disclose information for liter-
ary or media purposes directly parallels former prosecutors involved
in "revolving door" cases. First, the focus in both situations is on an
86. See supra notes 51-58 and accompanying text.
87. 597 F.2d 337 (2d Cir. 1979); see supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
88. Id The issue in this case was the representation of a defendant by a former
prosecutor in a case in which the former prosecutor played some role during his for-
mer employment. Id
89. 283 F. Supp. 464 (D. Minn. 1968), aff'd, 408 F.2d 1099 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 823 (1969); see supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
90. Id..
91. 673 P.2d 509 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983).
92. Id at 514. The New Mexico Court of Appeals held that because the State
"expressly stated on the record that it did not care whether counsel was allowed to
withdraw or not," this operated as a waiver of any possible breach of the State's confi-
dences. Id. at 513; see supra note 58.
93. See discussion supra part I.B.
94. The Department of Justice regulations state that the head of the office-the
attorney general-is the individual who can consent to disclosures not addressed in
the Department's disclosure regulations. The regulation provides:
If a representative of the Department believes that in the interest of the fair
administration of justice and the law enforcement process information be-
yond these guidelines should be released, in a particular case, he shall re-
quest the permission of the Attorney General or the Deputy Attorney
General to do so.
28 C.F.R. § 50.2(b)(9) (1994).
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assistant prosecutor who wants to make, or may possibly make, a dis-
closure of representational information. Second, the purpose for the
disclosure in each case is unrelated to a pending prosecution. Instead,
the disclosure is for a purpose completely outside of his duties and,
thus, outside his authority. Accordingly, an assistant prosecutor lacks
the authority to disclose representational information for literary or
media purposes. As in the "revolving cases," if the assistant prosecu-
tor wishes to make such a disclosure, he must obtain the permission of
the chief prosecutor. 95
The relative intra-office authority of chief prosecutors and assistant
prosecutors supports the argument that an assistant prosecutor should
be required to obtain the chief prosecutor's permission before re-
vealing representational information for nonprosecutorial purposes.
Although an assistant prosecutor represents the public and may make
"client" decisions for the public, he derives his authority from the in-
dividual who appointed him. The district attorney, the United States
attorney general, and the special prosecutor are the individuals given
the authority to conduct criminal litigation on behalf of the people
and to make decisions that are in the public's best interest.96 Not only
do these chief prosecutors conduct prosecutions, but they also set of-
fice policies, hire assistant prosecutors, define investigative priorities,
95. See William Josephson & Russell Pearce, To Whom Does the Government
Lawyer Owe the Duty of Loyalty When Clients Are in Conflict?, 29 How. L.J. 539, 566
(1986) (arguing that a government lawyer facing a conflict of interest where she is
asked to represent a government agency with interests adverse to a former govern-
ment agency client cannot decide for herself what interest to represent, but must "re-
fer the dispute to the policy superior of both her clients for resolution").
96. For example, with regards to the district attorney, New York State law pro-
vides, "[]it shall be the duty of every district attorney to conduct all prosecutions for
crimes and offenses cognizable by the courts of the county for which he shall have
been elected or appointed." N.Y. County Law § 700(1) (McKinney Supp. 1995). By
statute, the United States attorney general is designated as the head of the Depart-
ment of Justice. 28 U.S.C. § 503 (1988). In delineating the attorney general's duties,
the statute provides that the "conduct of litigation in which the United States, an
agency, or officer thereof is a party, or is interested, and securing evidence therefor, is
reserved to... the Department of Justice, under the direction of the Attorney Gen-
eral." 28 U.S.C. § 516 (1988).
The special prosecutor is typically given, by statute, all the powers of a chief prose-
cutor during the period of his appointment. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 20-1-109
(1986) (stating that a special prosecutor shall posses the same powers in prosecuting a
case as the district attorney he replaces); N.Y. County Law § 701(4) (McKinney Supp.
1995) ("The special [prosecutor] so appointed shall possess the powers and discharge
the duties of the district attorney during the period for which he or she shall be ap-
pointed."). The scope of a special prosecutor's authority, however, is limited to the
specific job to which he has been assigned by the authority who appointed him. See,
e.g., United States v. Weiner, 392 F. Supp. 81, 85-86 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (holding that a
special prosecutor may not exceed the scope of his authority as defined by the attor-
ney general who appointed him); People v. Leahy, 72 N.Y.2d 510 (1988) (holding that
where a special prosecutor exceeds the limited scope of his authority as defined by the
authority who appointed him, the resulting indictment must be dismissed).
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and make all other decisions affecting their offices. 7 Although the
most visible of these tasks is conducting criminal prosecutions,
The [chief] prosecutor in America wears three hats. He is a lawyer,
an administrator, and a public official with policy-making responsi-
bilities. Within an office... he is likely to become less involved in
prosecution as a lawyer and more involved in administration and
policy-making. The chief prosecutor in the large office seldom en-
ters the courtroom. The cases are in the hands of his assistants, who
appear day after day in court to represent the State.9
Because of the enormous tasks many chief prosecutors face, they
often delegate authority to assistant prosecutors 9 While an assistant
prosecutor has the delegated authority to make prosecutorial deci-
sions, he may not set office policy or act beyond the limited authority
delegated to him by the chief prosecutor.'Y Thus, an assistant prose-
cutor who wants to write a book or cooperate on a movie about a case
he has handled can only do so with the permission of the chief prose-
cutor.10' Disclosure of information for literary or media purposes is
both beyond the professional duties of an assistant prosecutor and is a
matter of office policy to be made by the head of the office.'02 While
97. Telephone Interview with Wayne Brison, Spokesperson for the New York
County District Attorney's Office (February 15, 1995) (discussing the authority of the
chief prosecutor).
98. Overview and Introduction to The Prosecutor in America 2-3 (John Jay
Douglass ed., 1977).
99. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 510 (1988) ("The Attorney General may from time to
time make such provisions as he considers appropriate authorizing the performance
by any other officer, employee, or agency of the Department of Justice of any func-
tion of the Attorney General.").
100. See, eg., N.Y. County Law § 702(2) (McKinney 1991) ("The assistant [prose-
cutor] shall perform such duties pertaining to the office as may be directed by the
district attorney.").
101. Some offices may simply forbid the release of certain information for literary
or media purposes. For instance, the Department of Justice allows the release of non-
public information if it is in the interest of justice, but will not allow it for personal
financial gain:
No employee shall use for financial gain for himself or for another person, or
make any other improper use of, whether by direct action on his part or by
counsel, recommendation, or suggestion to another person, information
which comes to the employee by reason of his status as a Department of
Justice employee and which has not become part of the body of public
information.
28 C.F.R. § 45.735-10 (1994); see supra note 94 (stating the Department of Justice
regulation concerning the procedure for disclosures which are deemed to be in the
public interest). While this regulation only covers the release of nonpublic informa-
tion for personal financial gain, the confidentiality rules, DR 4-101 and Rule 1.6, gov-
ern any information obtained in the course of representation even where it is
available from other sources. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
102. John K. Carlock, who served over 20 years in the federal government as a
lawyer in the Treasury Department, commented on the authority of department heads
in comparison to the lawyers they supervise:
I do not believe that the ritual of becoming a member of the bar invests a
government lawyer with a power of life and death over the agency he serves.
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the chief prosecutor may choose to delegate that decision, in the ab-
sence of any such delegation, he is the only person with the authority
to allow such a disclosure.
Sound public policy also supports limiting the authority of assistant
prosecutors to make such disclosures. The assistant prosecutor's duty
to the public and to the office is to prosecute cases and to see that
justice is done.10 3 An assistant prosecutor having unlimited authority
to disclose representational information would have an enormous
temptation to conduct prosecutions with future book and movie con-
tracts in mind. His loyalties would then be divided and he might make
professional decisions that are not in the public's interest, but rather
in his personal interest. Even this appearance of conflicting interests
would compromise the integrity of the prosecutor's office. Noting the
importance of the prosecutor's function and the need to maintain a
"primary loyalty"'' 04 to the public, one commentator remarked, "Be-
cause of the nature of the [prosecutor's] office and the responsibilities
of the job, it goes without saying that the office should be run in such a
manner that all appearances of professional impropriety are notably
absent."' 5 Clearly, an assistant prosecutor with unlimited disclosure
authority would have a conflict of interest when he is handling a high-
profile murder trial and forthcoming movie offers are likely. Actions
consistent with zealously advancing the prosecution are not always
consistent with maintaining the publication or media value of the case.
Recognizing such a potential conflict, EC 5-4 provides:
If, in the course of his representation of a client, a lawyer is permit-
ted to receive from his client a beneficial ownership in publication
rights relating to the subject matter of the employment, he may be
tempted to subordinate the interests of his client to his own antici-
pated pecuniary gain.... [The lawyer] may be influenced ... to a
course of conduct that will enhance the value of his publication
rights to the prejudice of his client. 1' 6
To prevent such a conflict, the Code and Model Rules prohibit law-
yers from obtaining such an interest in a case until the matter is con-
cluded. 107 Once the representation has been completed, the client
The agency head takes his own oath of office, and he is also subject to the
inscrutable forces of public opinion. In carrying out his responsibility to de-
cide policy, the agency head looks to his lawyer's counseling as one of his
strongest supports; but the lawyer's counsel can never usurp the decision
which must be made by the responsible head of the agency.
John K. Carlock, The Lawyer in Government, in Listen To Leaders In Law 255, 269
(Albert Love & James Saxon Childers eds., 1963).
103. ABA Prosecution Standards, supra note 14, Standard 3-1.2(c) (stating that
"[tihe duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice").
104. Nissman & Hagen, supra note 62, at 10.
105. Id.
106. Code, supra note 4, EC 5-4.
107. Id. DR 5-104(B) (prohibiting a lawyer from entering into an agreement with a
client by which the attorney acquires an interest in the publication rights of a case
1828 [Vol. 63
DUTY OF CONFIDENTIALITY
decides whether to allow the attorney to make any disclosures relating
to the representation, pursuant to confidentiality rules."° If an assis-
tant prosecutor had unlimited disclosure authority, he might be
tempted throughout the prosecution of a high-proffle case to make
decisions that would enhance the marketability of the case for media
purposes. Such unlimited authority to disclose confidences may result
in inadequate legal representation in criminal prosecutions. The pros-
ecutor may seek only to win a case and handle the case in a way that
generates the most publicity rather than to see "that justice shall be
done."'1 9 The assistant prosecutor cannot make a decision in the pub-
lic interest when his personal interest in the decision is so overwhelm-
ing. The strong public interest in minimizing such temptations for the
assistant prosecutor demands that an assistant prosecutor's power to
disclose be limited.
The hierarchical structure of representative government further
supports limiting the assistant prosecutor's power to disclose repre-
sentational information." 0 Only the highest ranking officer of the de-
partment or office has the authority of the people, by statutory
directive or by popular election, to conduct all prosecutions and over-
see the office.1 ' The district attorney is responsible to the people
who elect him," 2 the special prosecutor is accountable to the author-
ity who appoints him," 3 and the attorney general answers to the presi-
dent." 4 Appointed assistants act in the name of the public, only with
until all aspects of the matter are concluded); Model Rules, supra note 3. Rule 1.8(d)
(same).
108. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying texL
109. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
110. Cf., Josephson & Pearce, supra note 95, at 568-69 (arguing that a government
must be run by laws and not lawyers to function effectively).
111. See e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 503 (1988) (stating that the United States attorney gen-
eral is the head of the Department of Justice); 28 U.S.C. § 518 (1988) (stating that the
United States attorney general's authority supersedes everyone else's in the Depart-
ment of Justice when it comes to conducting civil or criminal cases).
112. In all but five states (Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, New Jersey, and Rhode
Island), the district attorney is elected. Joan E. Jacoby, The Charging Policies of Pros-
ecutors, in The Prosecutor 75, 95 n.2 (William F. McDonald ed., 1979).
113. If the special prosecutor is to serve the federal government, a three-judge
panel or the attorney general appoints the prosecutor, depending upon the circum-
stances. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599 (1988) (three-judge panel appoints an independent
counsel upon request of attorney general); 28 U.S.C. § 515(a) (1988) (allowing the
attorney general to appoint a special prosecutor and delineate the special prosecutor's
authority). If the special prosecutor is to serve a locality, local appointment proce-
dures would be followed. See e.g., N.Y. Exec. Law § 63(2) (McKinney 1993) (author-
izing the governor to appoint the attorney general or one of his deputies to head a
criminal prosecution and "exercise all the powers and perform all the duties ... which
the district attorney would otherwise be authorized or required to exercise or per-
form"); N.Y. County Law § 701 (McKinney 1995) (authorizing a superior criminal
court to appoint a special prosecutor when the district attorney is disqualified for any
reason); see also supra note 96 (discussing the powers of the special prosecutor and
the limits placed on his power by the authority that appointed him).
114. See 28 U.S.C. § 503 (1988).
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the limited authority given to them by the chief prosecutor. 115 Grant-
ing an assistant prosecutor unlimited power to disclose would under-
mine this framework by sending the public conflicting signals as to the
status of prosecutions, actual office policies and priorities, and even
who the public official in charge really is. Rather than the department
head having unparalleled authority to speak for the office and publicly
disclose office information as he deems appropriate, any assistant
prosecutor would be able to do this on any issue, thus undermining
the credibility of the chief prosecutor. The public would question the
capability of the office and the authority of the chief prosecutor in
representing its interests. As chief prosecutor and the recognized
head of the office, he must be viewed as the final voice on all matters
and his words must be credible. Absent disclosure limitations, assis-
tant prosecutors might undermine this role of the chief prosecutor.
The effective functioning of the prosecutor's office also requires
that the assistant prosecutor's power to disclose office confidences be
limited. In the absence of limits, office confidences may be disclosed
at the whim of an assistant prosecutor with a financial interest in do-
ing so. Should such a disclosure occur, an office atmosphere of mis-
trust and suspicion might prevail. Discussions may be chilled and
investigations possibly thwarted. 116
Thus, because of the need to prevent conflicts of interest, maintain
the hierarchical structure of the office, and ensure the effective func-
tioning of the office, an assistant prosecutor with an intention of writ-
ing a book or cooperating on a movie production following a
prosecution must first obtain the permission of the head of the
office.117
115. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
116. See discussion infra part III.B.
117. As with other decisions made by prosecutors, there is a presumption that the
chief prosecutor will decide whether to grant or deny a request for disclosure in good
faith. See, e.g., United States v. Bassford, 812 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir.) ("[T]he courts
should presume that the prosecution was pursued in good faith execution of the
law.... To overcome the presumption of good faith, a defendant must establish that
his prosecution results from 'intentional and purposeful discrimination.' "), cert. de-
nied, 481 U.S. 1022 (1987).
In addition to the good faith presumption, if the chief prosecutor feels that he can-
not make an objective decision in the public's best interest as to disclosure for media
or literary purposes, he has an ethical duty to submit that decision to an impartial
decision maker. See Model Rules, supra note 3, Rule 1.7(b) ("A lawyer shall not rep-
resent a client if the representation of that client may be materially limited by the
lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third person, or by the lawyer's own
interests ... ." (emphasis added)); see also infra notes 126-32 (discussing the prosecu-
tor's duty to recuse himself from cases where his personal interests may influence his
professional decisions). This may occur in cases in which the subject of the proposed
book will have a strong effect on the chief prosecutor's personal interests. For exam-
ple, if a district attorney is up for re-election and the book's publication may ensure a
victory or cause certain defeat, the decision should be delegated to a impartial party.
1830 [Vol. 63
DUTY OF CONFIDENTIALITY
B. The Delegation Approack When the Chief Prosecutor Wants to
Write a Book
The chief prosecutor has the complete authority of the people to
make all decisions on their behalf in performing the prosecution func-
tion. The chief prosecutor sets office policy in the manner he deems
will best serve the public interest of pursuing justice. As one court
noted, "A district attorney cannot treat that office as his selfish affair.
It is a public trust. The office is not private property, but is to be held
and administered wholly in the interests of the people at large and
with an eye single to their welfare."' 8 The chief prosecutor must
therefore conduct the prosecutor's office in an impartial manner to
best serve the public.
A chief prosecutor has the authority to allow disclosures regarding
the office that he believes to be in the public interest. Such disclosures
need not even be within the context of a pending prosecution. As the
ranking public official in the prosecutor's office, "he has a responsibil-
ity to advise the press and the public of the status of the criminal jus-
tice system.""' 9 For example, the chief prosecutor may release office
statistics relating to prosecutions,' 20 hold press conferences about the
status of cases,' 2 ' or allow assistant prosecutors to disclose representa-
tional information for news purposes. 122 While he makes all office
decisions, the chief prosecutor is precluded from taking action where
his personal interests are directly affected. 23
A chief prosecutor has a conflict of interest when he wants to write
a book that will disclose information learned in the course of repre-
senting the public. Even though he may believe that writing a book is
in the public interest and that he can objectively decide whether dis-
closure is appropriate, there is still a conflict-of-interest issue. As one
commentator keenly noted, "In conflict-of-interest theory, it is not
only the reality of a conflict of interest, but also the appearance of
118. Attorney General v. Tufts, 132 N.E. 322, 326 (Mass. 1921) (finding that the
state attorney general had shown sufficient cause for the removal of a district attorney
for corruption while in office).
119. Overview and Introduction to The Prosecutor in America 4 (John Jay Douglass
ed., 1977).
120. See National Prosecution Standards § 13 commentary at 47 (Nat'l District
Att'ys Ass'n 2d ed. 1991) ("The prosecutor should utilize office statistics to keep the
community informed of the trends in local crime and with the efforts of the prosecu-
tor's office to combat crime."); Telephone Interview with Wayne Brison, Spokesper-
son for New York County District Attorney's Office (February 15, 1995) (discussing
the chief prosecutor's broad discretion).
121. See Matheson, supra note 2, at 866-67 (discussing press conferences by prose-
cutors regarding a pending case). However, prosecutorial disclosures regarding pend-
ing cases must be within the bounds of DR 7-107, which governs trial publicity and
attorney comments in light of the prejudicial effects such extrajudicial speech may
have on a trial. See Code, supra note 4, DR 7-107.
122. Telephone Interview with Wayne Brison, New York County District Attor-
ney's Office (February 15, 1995).
123. See infra notes 126-32 and accompanying text.
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one, that is considered undesirable."' 4 The Code likewise states that
"care should be taken by the lawyer to avoid even the appearance of
impropriety.", 2 5
Because the "prosecutor must strive to conduct his office and his
duties in a completely professional and non-partisan way, exercising
his powers and authority of his position for the interest of the People
and not for any private or personal concern,"'' 6 the chief prosecutor
must recuse himself from any decisions in which his personal or finan-
cial gain is directly affected.' 7 When the chief prosecutor wants to
write a book or aid in a movie production, his personal interest and
his duty to make impartial decisions in the public interest collide.
Therefore, he must delegate the decision to an impartial decision
maker who can decide whether such a disclosure will serve the public
interest.
A chief prosecutor must recuse himself in other situations where he
has a conflict, or even the appearance of conflict. For example, there
may be prosecutions or investigations where the target is somehow
associated with or related to the chief prosecutor. 128 In such in-
stances, a special prosecutor from outside the office "may be ap-
pointed to handle the investigation and to make all prosecutory
decisions."' 9 The independent counsel provisions of the Ethics in
124. Nolan, supra note 60, at 55 (footnote omitted). Nolan also observed that
"[j]ustice requires the appearance of justice for the same reason that conflict-free rep-
resentation requires the appearance of conflict-free representation: in both cases,
those outside the process must believe that the process is fair. It is a question of
confidence in government." Id. at 55-56; see also Young v. United States ex rel. Vuit-
ton et Fits, 481 U.S. 787, 806 (1987) (plurality) ("[Tihe appointment of counsel for an
interested party to bring a contempt prosecution in this case at a minimum created
opportunities for conflicts to arise, and created at least the appearance of impropri-
ety."); Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384, 1387 (2d Cir. 1976) ("'[A]n
attorney must avoid not only the fact, but even the appearance, of representing con-
flicting interests.'" (quoting Edeliman v. Levy, 346 N.Y.S.2d 347 (N.Y. App. Div.
1973))); National Prosecution Standards § 7.1 (Nat'l District Att'ys Ass'n 2d ed.,
1991) ("The prosecutor should avoid interests and activities which are likely to appear
to, or in fact do, conflict with the duties and responsibilities of the prosecutor's
office.").
125. Code, supra note 4, EC 5-6.
126. National Prosecution Standards § 1 commentary at 14 (Nat'l District Att'ys
Ass'n 1st ed., 1977).
127. See infra note 132 and accompanying text.
128. When White House officials and other presidential supporters were alleged to
have violated the law during the Watergate scandal, a special prosecutor was ap-
pointed because the Attorney General and Department of Justice were subordinate
to the President and closely associated with him. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S.
683, 694 n.8 (1974) (discussing the appointment of the special prosecutor and his need
to stay independent of the Department of Justice because of its close relationship to
the president).
129. John S. Edwards, Professional Responsibilities Of The Federal Prosecutor, 17
U. Rich. L. Rev. 511, 520 (1983). The United States attorney general is authorized by
statute to appoint an independent attorney to assist a United States Attorney if such
appointment would further the public interest. See 28 U.S.C. § 543(a) (1988).
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Government Act 130 authorize the replacement of "Justice Department
officials tainted by a potential conflict of interest in a specific case with
individuals who have no disabling relationship with the President, the
Attorney General, the Department of Justice, or the targets of the
investigations.' 13' Additionally, "[i]n any case in which the prosecu-
tor's interest can be said to be adverse or prejudicial to the state's
interest, the prosecutor should disqualify himself and see to it that a
special prosecutor is appointed."'132
Therefore, where the chief prosecutor wants to reveal office confi-
dences pursuant to a literary or media agreement, he must recuse him-
self from deciding if the disclosure is appropriate because he has a
conflict of interest. The chief prosecutor must then delegate that deci-
sion-making authority to an impartial party, just as he would delegate
prosecutorial authority to a special prosecutor should he have a con-
flict of interest in prosecuting a case. A district attorney who is
elected and answers to no appointing authority should follow the local
appointment procedures governing situations where he has a conflict
of interest, and a special prosecutor must be appointed.133 A United
States attorney general, special prosecutor, or independent counsel in-
terested in writing a book should turn to the party who appointed him
to decide if disclosing office confidences would be in the public inter-
est. This is necessary because unlike the popularly elected district at-
torney,'3' each of these individuals must answer to a superior. 35
Consequently, they have a duty to report the conflict of interest to
130. Title VI of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L No. 95-521, 92 Stat.
1824, 1867-75 (1978) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599 (1988)). The pro-
visions for appointment of an independent counsel provide that, upon application by
the attorney general, a special three-judge panel of the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit shall appoint an independent counsel to
investigate and prosecute certain high-level government officials. See 28 U.S.C.
§§ 592-593 (1988).
131. Nolan, supra note 60, at 9.
132. Nissman & Hagen, supra note 62, at 11; see also Young v. State, 177 So. 2d 345,
346 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (stating that a special prosecutor should be appointed in
any case where a prosecutor has a personal interest to avoid the appearance of impro-
priety); Hendricks v. State, 196 N.E. 2d 66, 67 (Ind. 1964) (stating that if prosecutor's
interest is adverse to the state's, the prosecutor should recuse himself and a special
prosecutor be appointed); National Prosecution Standards § 7.4(a) (Nat'l District
Att'ys Ass'n 2d ed. 1991) ("The prosecutor should have discretion to appoint or to
petition the court for an appointment of a special prosecutor in cases where actual or
potential conflicts of interest exist.").
133. See, e.g., Cal. Gov't Code § 12553 (Vest 1992) ("If a district attorney is dis-
qualified to conduct any criminal prosecution within the county, the Attorney Gen-
eral may employ special counsel to conduct the prosecution."); N.Y. County Law
§ 701 (McKinney 1995) (authorizing a superior criminal court to appoint a special
prosecutor when the district attorney is disqualified for any reason).
134. See supra note 112.
135. See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
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their superior and let the superior make the decision, as is consistent
with the hierarchical structure of government.1 36
III. CONSIDERATIONS IN DECIDING IF DISCLOSURE IS
APPROPRIATE
Once it is clear who is the appropriate individual to decide whether
to allow the disclosure of prosecutorial information pursuant to a lit-
erary or media agreement, certain factors must be considered to de-
cide whether such a disclosure is in the public interest. Just as a
private client weighs certain elements to determine what is in his best
interest before waiving confidentiality rights to his defense counsel,
the same should be done when the client is the public. The private
client may consider his own financial gain from the lawyer's intended
literary pursuit, the effect of disclosures on his reputation, the chances
of further reprisal by the prosecution, and even the possibility that
civil litigation may be instituted against him because of the disclosures
in a "tell all" book.137 The client will balance what benefits he may
receive by such a disclosure against the detriments. The private client
can then ultimately determine what is in his best interest. This type of
balancing should also be done for the public client to decide if such a
disclosure is truly in the public interest. An individual client's per-
sonal considerations, however, are not the same factors relevant in
determining whether a prosecutorial waiver of confidentiality is in the
general public's best interest. The specific factors to be analyzed in
the case of the public client become apparent only after examining the
unique purposes served by confidentiality in a prosecutor's office and
then balancing those factors against the public interest in knowing
how prosecutors perform their duties.
This part first examines the general purposes of confidentiality rules
for all attorneys. The focus then shifts to the unique purposes served
by confidentiality rules in the prosecutor's office. Those purposes re-
veal what considerations will weigh into the disclosure balancing test.
Finally, this part discusses the public interests that are served by a
prosecutor's disclosures for literary or media works.
136. See Josephson & Pearce, supra note 95, at 566. These commentators observed:
Obviously, the highest elected government official should generally be the
highest policy dispute resolution authority, superior even as to issues of law
to the ranking government lawyer, especially if she appoints that lawyer....
The first duty of the government lawyer, when confronted by a conflict [of
interest], is to refer the dispute to the policy superior... for resolution.
Id.
137. Claus von Bulow's cooperation for a book by his attorney on his appeal from a
murder conviction eventually worked against him in a civil matter. A court held that
von Bulow's consent to the book constituted a waiver of the attorney-client privilege,
and thus the material discussed in the book was discoverable in a related civil case.
See von Bulow v. von Bulow, 828 F.2d 94, 101 (2d Cir. 1987); see also supra note 11
(discussing von Bulow's actions which were found to constitute a waiver of
confidentiality).
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A. General Purposes of Confidentiality
The duty of confidentiality serves general purposes for all clients-
private or public. First, the duty of confidentiality fosters a belief that
the lawyer can be trusted so that he may obtain all relevant informa-
tion from the client and potential witnesses, thus enhancing the qual-
ity of representation. 1' In addition, the duty of confidentiality
"encourages people to seek early legal assistance."'1 39
Because the duty to maintain professional confidences survives ter-mination of the case,"4 and the right to waive confidentiality is exclu-
sively that of the client, that duty precludes a lawyer from switching
sides on a case or later using information learned in the course of
representation to benefit himself or a third party.' 4' Clients feel more
comfortable revealing information when they know that their attor-
neys cannot reveal those confidences without permission.4 2 While a
prosecutor does not give legal advice to individual clients in the same
way as other attorneys do, he does need to develop completely the
relevant facts to seek a just result and provide the best possible repre-
sentation. To obtain the essential facts, the prosecutor must assure
informants or victims of some level of confidentiality. Certainly some
facts will be disclosed at trial, turned over to the defense pursuant to
discovery rules, or even revealed to comply with a court order. Yet, a
person with relevant information is more willing to come forward
sooner when she feels that she will not be exploited and will be pro-
tected to the fullest extent possible. 43 The confidentiality rule, and
the disciplinary action that may be imposed for breaches of the rule,
deter attorney exploitation of confidences and thus encourages the
138. The Comment to Model Rule 1.6 states, "The observance of the ethical obliga-
tion of a lawyer to hold inviolate confidential information of the client ... facilitates
the full development of facts essential to proper representation ... ." Model Rules,
supra note 3, Rule 1.6 cmt.
139. Id.
140. See id. Rule 1.6 cmt. ("The duty of confidentiality continues after the client-
lawyer relationship has terminated.").
141. The ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility has opined
that the confidentiality canon and the conflict of interest canons "reinforce the same
ethical precepts." ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal
Op. 342 (1975).
142. One commentator noted:
Unless the client is assured that his confidences will be kept, he will not
communicate all of the pertinent facts with full freedom and honesty, and
therefore the social good which is commonly recognized to be derived from
the proper performance of the functions of lawyers for their clients will be
impaired.
Irving R. Kaufman, The Former Government Attorney and The Canons of Profes-
sional Ethics, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 657, 659 (1957).
143. See infra note 169.
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flow of information to attorneys, thereby enhancing the quality of
legal representation.'"
As with defense attorneys, the need to prevent both actual and ap-
parent conflicts of interest 145 is necessary to maintain the prosecutor's
loyalty to the client. Prosecutors, like other attorneys, would other-
wise be subject to the same temptations to reveal confidences for fi-
nancial gain or to advance opportunities for future employment in the
absence of any confidentiality rule. 1 4 6 Also, as noted earlier, courts
will disqualify former prosecutors from cases where there is any risk
that specific confidences learned from their previous employment may
be disclosed to advance the interests of their private clients in related
matters.147 Confidentiality rules thus foster the necessary relationship
of trust and loyalty between lawyers and the persons with whom they
interact professionally.
B. Purposes of Confidentiality Unique to the Prosecutor
Most of the general purposes of confidentiality apply to all attor-
ney-cient relationships regardless of whether the attorney is a prose-
cutor, private attorney, or government-agency attorney.148 Yet, there
are purposes of confidentiality unique to prosecutors. Underlying
these special functions of confidentiality is the notion that the public's
overriding interest in prosecutions is to see "that justice shall be
done."'14 9 Accordingly, the prosecutor's office must function in the
144. See Code, supra note 4, EC 4-1 ("The observance of the ethical obligation of a
lawyer to hold inviolate the confidences and secrets of his client not only facilitates
the full development of facts essential to proper representation of the client but also
encourages laymen to seek early legal assistance."). But see Zacharias, supra note 2, at
366-67 (arguing that confidentiality rules may have little effect on client
forthrightness).
145. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
146. The ABA Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances stated:
"The duty of an attorney to his clients is one of great delicacy and responsi-
bility and sometimes of apparent hardship. Every consideration of personal
advantage or profit must be subordinated to the interest and welfare of the
client, and information derived from the close and intimate relationship nec-
essarily existing should not be used to promote personal interests or for per-
sonal gain."
ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 250 (1943) (quoting
Healy v. Gray, 168 N.W. 222 (Iowa 1969)).
147. See supra notes 51-58 and accompanying text.
148. The only general purposes of the confidentiality rules that do not apply to
prosecutors are those that specifically apply to the attorney-cient relationship. Yet,
the need to foster a relationship of trust with other persons, such as witnesses, whom
an attorney will encounter during representation applies to the prosecutor.
149. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935); see also Corrigan, supra
note 61, at 539 (stating that citizens "give over to the prosecutor the authority to seek
a just result in their name"); George T. Felkenes, The Criminal Justice System: Its
Functions and Personnel, in The Prosecutor in America 19 (John Jay Douglass ed.,
1977) ("[T]he primary responsibility of the prosecuting attorney is ... to see that
justice is achieved.").
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way most effective to render justice, and that requires some level of
confidentiality within the office.
The unique purposes of confidentiality are recognized by case law
and government regulations-primarily, the Freedom of Information
Act ("FOIA"). 5 0 The FOIA contains regulations for all federal agen-
cies regarding public access to documents, and delineates what
records "[e]ach agency... shall make available for public inspection
and copying."'' The FOIA mandates that federal agencies must turn
over all government documents to the public, subject to limited excep-
tions.'52 By delineating exemptions to the mandatory disclosure pol-
icy, Congress recognized certain purposes of confidentiality. 5 3 Many
of the special purposes of confidentiality as specified in the FOIA ex-
emptions also serve the prosecutorial function through attorney confi-
dentiality rules. An examination of the special needs for
confidentiality in the prosecutorial setting reveals what must be con-
sidered in a decision on whether to waive a prosecutor's duty of
confidentiality.
1. Potential Prejudice to Pending Investigations
Investigations related to a prosecution may be compromised absent
confidentiality within a prosecutor's office. For example, suppose a
prosecutor were about to expose a major drug ring and had obtained
the relevant search and arrest warrants. If other prosecutors were
free to reveal information on the impending arrests to the public, the
investigation would be frustrated because the criminals would un-
doubtedly destroy the evidence. A prosecutor's duty of confidential-
ity protects pending investigations from such damaging disclosures."
Congress explicitly recognized the need for confidentiality where
disclosure may impede pending investigations. Exemption 7(A) of
the FOIA exempts from mandatory public disclosure any records or
information compiled by federal agencies for law enforcement pur-
150. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988). The FOIA governs which
documents federal agencies must make available to the public. The FOIA does not
forbid disclosures by agency employees. "l
151. I& § 552(a)(2).
152. The FOIA delineates nine exemptions to the mandatory disclosure policy. See
id. § 552(b)(1)-(9). With regard to those exemptions, the FOIA simply states: "This
section does not apply." Id. § 552(b). For those exemptions, the agency has the dis-
cretion, subject to its own internal policies, as to whether to release the exempted
information.
153. S. Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1965) (stating that "[t]here is, of
course, a certain need for confidentiality in some aspects of Government operations
and these are protected specifically [in the FOIA]").
154. In addition to the duty of confidentiality, a prosecutor is also bound by law
from disclosing investigatory information in some circumstances. For instance, the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure prohibit a prosecutor from disclosing "matter
occurring before the grand jury" to maintain the secrecy of grand jury proceedings.
Fed. R_ Crim. P. 6(e)(2).
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poses that could reasonably be expected to "interfere with enforce-
ment proceedings."'155
Additionally, in United States v. Snepp, 56 the United States
Supreme Court recognized a need for confidentiality during investiga-
tions. The Court stated that the "Government has a compelling inter-
est in protecting both the secrecy of information important to our
national security and the appearance of confidentiality so essential to
the effective operation of our foreign intelligence service. 1 57 While
this case dealt with foreign intelligence operations, the general princi-
ples dealing with the need for confidentiality in investigations are just
as applicable to operations conducted by a local district attorney's of-
fice. Thus, confidentiality is imperative for public offices with investi-
gatory functions.
2. Potential Prejudice to Pending Cases
Confidentiality rules also ensure that legal proceedings are not dis-
rupted by extrajudicial disclosures by prosecutors. For instance, if a
former assistant prosecutor released a book or gave inside informa-
tion to movie producers about the investigation of a highly publicized
case prior to the trial of individuals indicted as a result of that investi-
gation, the potential jury pool could be prejudiced. 5 8 This behavior
might deny the defendants a fair trial by keeping the jurors from ren-
dering a verdict based only upon the evidence. Indeed, such a disclo-
sure could also prejudice pending appeals. The prosecutor's ethical
duty of confidentiality removes such concerns.
In the FOIA, Congress addressed this need for confidentiality by
exempting from mandatory public disclosure any information com-
piled for federal law enforcement purposes that would "deprive a per-
son of a right to a fair trial.' 59 DR 7-107 of the Code also emphasizes
this need for confidentiality by limiting the extrajudicial statements an
attorney may make prior to trial, during a trial, and prior to sentenc-
155. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(7)(A) (1988).
156. 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (holding that where a former Central Intelligence Agency
employee who published a book about certain Agency activities, without first submit-
ting the book for prepublication review, breached a fiduciary obligation because he
had agreed not to divulge classified information relating to his former employment
without prepublication clearance). See Frank W. Snepp, III, Decent Interval (1977)
(documenting CIA involvement in Indochina during the 1960s-70s).
157. 444 U.S. at 509 n.3.
158. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (holding that a defendant was
denied his right to a fair trial where: the massive publicity attending his prosecution
permeated the jury pool prior to jury selection; a newspaper published the names and
addresses of prospective jurors; and because the jurors were not sequestered once the
trial began, and there was a sufficient probability they may have been improperly
influenced by news reports during the trial).
159. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(B) (1988).
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ing to ensure that such comments do not improperly affect legal
proceedings. 16
3. Protection of Confidential Informants
Confidentiality rules protect, maintain, and cultivate relationships
with confidential informants who provide vital information to the
prosecution. In McCray v. Illinois,161 the Supreme Court endorsed a
lower court's assertion that "'the informer is a vital part of society's
defensive arsenal. The basic rule protecting his identity rests upon
that belief.' "162 The Supreme Court similarly declared that the con-
tinued availability of confidential informants "depends upon the [gov-
ernment's] ability to guarantee the security of information that might
compromise them."' 63 Thus, confidential informants are invaluable to
prosecutors, and those informants will not come forward unless prose-
cutors are bound by some obligation to keep their relationship
confidential.
Under exemption 7(D) of the FOIA, Congress also specifically rec-
ognized the necessity of protecting confidential informants by exempt-
ing from mandatory public disclosure any federal records compiled for
law enforcement purposes that "could reasonably be expected to dis-
close the identity of a confidential source."'" The Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia has stated that this exemption prevents
the "'drying up' of sources of information in criminal investiga-
tions' 1 65 and that its "purpose will not be achieved unless the person
providing information under the assurance that it will not be disclosed
can rely upon the fact that his disclosure will not result in further pub-
lication."'166 The Second Circuit reiterated this, declaring that the pur-
pose of confidentiality with regard to informants is "to encourage
cooperation with law enforcement agencies by enabling the agencies
to keep their informants' identities confidential." 67
The importance of protecting confidential informants is also implicit
in federal discovery rules. In a federal criminal prosecution, the gov-
ernment is required to turn over to the defense only those statements
or reports made by witnesses who have testified at trial.6' Confiden-
160. See Code, supra note 4, DR 7-107; see also Model Rules, supra note 3, Rule
3.6(a) (stating that a lawyer may not make an extrajudicial statement that he reason-
ably knows "will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudica-
tive proceeding").
161. 386 U.S. 300 (1967).
162. Id at 307 (quoting State v. Burnett, 201 A.2d 39, 44 (NJ. 1964)).
163. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 512 (1980).
164. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(D) (1988).
165. Shaw v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 749 F.2d 58, 61 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
166. Id
167. United Technologies Corp. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 777 F.2d 90, 94 (2d
Cir. 1985).
168. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a) (1985).
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tial informants are more apt to provide crucial investigatory informa-
tion when they are assured that they will not have to testify at trial so
as to keep their identity secret.169 The discovery rules recognize the
role informants play and seek to accommodate their reluctance to
come forward.
4. Protection of Law Enforcement Strategies
The confidentiality rules also preserve the effectiveness of law en-
forcement strategies by ensuring that investigatory tactics will not be
revealed. For example, a prosecutor's office would not want to reveal
how relationships with informants are cultivated or the steps investi-
gators typically take to infiltrate drug rings. Such public revelations
would frustrate those tactics and allow easier circumvention of the
law, thus rendering the task of pursuing justice and protecting society
more difficult.
Congress, under the FOIA, also recognized the importance of pre-
serving the secrecy of law enforcement strategies. Congress exempted
from public disclosure any investigatory records that "would disclose
techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or pros-
ecutions ... if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk
circumvention of the law.' a7 0
5. Endangerment of the Lives, Physical Safety, or
Reputations of Others
Confidentiality rules protect the lives and physical safety of under-
cover agents, individuals who may have provided crucial help on a
case and are under protection at an undisclosed location, and others
who may have played a key role in an investigation or prosecution.
For instance, without confidentiality obligations, if a prosecutor writes
a book about an organized crime prosecution, he may inadvertently
reveal facts tending to expose undercover agents operating in similar
investigations. Agents and other key individuals in an investigation
would be jeopardized. Additionally, confidentiality rules protect the
reputations of innocent people who may be investigated but subse-
quently cleared as a result of the investigation. If a prosecutor was
free to reveal the name of anyone who was investigated or whose
name was tangentially related to an investigation, despite the fact that
169. As Professor Wigmore stated in his treatise on evidence:
Whether an informer is motivated by good citizenship, promise of leniency
or prospect of pecuniary reward, he will usually condition his cooperation on
an assurance of anonymity-to protect himself and his family from harm, to
preclude adverse social reactions and to avoid the risk of defamation or ma-
licious prosecution accusations against him.... Law enforcement officers
often depend upon professional informers to furnish them with a flow of
information about criminal activities.
8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2374 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
170. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(E) (1988).
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she may never have been brought to trial, her reputation would suffer
irreparably. A public revelation that an individual was somehow
named in an investigation, regardless of the fact that the evidence did
not support an indictment or any substantial allegation of wrongdoing,
would cause some people to believe the individual is guilty of some
crime. Reckless disclosures may very well harm innocent people. Im-
posing a duty of confidentiality on prosecutors alleviates these types
of dangers.
The FOIA also recognizes this importance of confidentiality. Ex-
emptions 7(B), (C), and (F) allow agencies to withhold from public
disclosure any investigatory records that could "endanger the life or
physical safety of any individual,"'' may "deprive a person of a right
to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication," or "could reasonably be
expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal pri-
vacy."'1 73 The prosecutor's duty of confidentiality protects the lives,
physical safety, and reputations of persons somehow involved in sensi-
tive investigations.
6. Encouraging Candid Office Exchanges
Within the office, prosecutors discuss investigatory tactics or litiga-
tion strategies amongst themselves in an effort to pursue the best al-
ternative. 74 These exchanges are quite beneficial because the more
ideas that are considered, the better the quality of representation.
Yet, candid office discussions are best fostered in an atmosphere
where participants are free to speak their innermost thoughts without
the fear of leaks or public disclosure. A prosecutor's duty of confiden-
tiality encourages the type of environment where ideas and comments
flow freely.
The importance of such an office environment was recognized in
the United States Senate report amending the FOIA and exempting
inter-agency letters or intra-agency memoranda or letters from the
public disclosure requirements: 171
It was pointed out in the comments of many of the agencies that it
would be impossible to have any frank discussion of legal or policy
matters in writing if all such writings were to be subjected to public
scrutiny. It was argued, and with merit, that efficiency of Govern-
171. 1d § 552(b)(7)(F).
172. Id. § 552(b)(7)(B).
173. Id. § 552(b)(7)(C).
174. President's Commission on Law Enforcement, Task Force Report: The Courts,
in The Prosecutor in America 90, 91-92 (John Jay Douglass ed., 1977) ("Whatever
training a new assistant prosecutor receives in addition to his experience on the job
usually is limited to informal discussions with senior assistants or the heads of depart-
ments to which he is assigned.").
175. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1988). This exemption is limited only to those papers
that "would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with
the agency." Id.
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ment would be greatly hampered if, with respect to legal and policy
matters, all Government agencies were prematurely forced to "op-
erate in a fishbowl.' 176
The recognized public policy interest in protecting "from inhibition
. . . the free flow of information and free discussion within the
agency"'177 demands a certain level of confidentiality.
The free exchange of ideas that is so crucial to the effective opera-
tion of a prosecutor's office would be inhibited if prosecutors feared
that coworkers might later reveal the private conversations among
members of the prosecution team. As the Supreme Court recognized,
there are certain "close working relationships for which it can persua-
sively be claimed that personal loyalty and confidence are necessary
to their proper functioning." 7 8 Due to the sensitive nature of many
investigations and prosecutions, and the fact that several prosecutors
may be assigned to work together on a case, a prosecutor's office
clearly falls within this category of relationships. Members of the
prosecution team must be free to discuss ideas without fear of reprisal,
leaks, or members of the team excoriating them in books after the
fact.
7. Preserving the Trust of Law Enforcement Agencies
The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administra-
tion of Justice observed that "the prosecutor is often an investigator
and initiator of the criminal process. Prosecutors work closely with
the police on important investigations.' 79 Trust between the relevant
parties is necessary for cooperation among various government offices
in a prosecution. If the police or FBI had concerns that a prosecutor
could not be trusted with information or had ulterior motives in an
investigation, the relationship between those individuals might break
down, compromising both pending and future investigations. In
Snepp v. United States,'80 the Supreme Court recognized the need for
confidentiality in intelligence operations because cooperation among
various agencies and the sharing of information depends upon a rela-
tionship of trust.' 8' While Snepp concerned foreign intelligence oper-
176. S. Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1965).
177. Note, The Freedom of Information Act and the Exemption For Intra-Agency
Memoranda, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1047, 1053 (1973).
178. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 570 (1968) (stating that when assess-
ing the propriety of a teacher's dismissal for making comments critical of the Board of
Education, courts must balance the teacher's interest as a citizen in making public
comments against the State's interest in promoting the efficient operation of its
schools).
179. The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Jus-
tice, Task Force Report: The Courts, in The Prosecutor in America 78, 79 (John Jay
Douglass ed., 1977).
180. 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
181. See id. at 512-13.
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ations, the same trust issues are implicated with prosecutor's offices
because they also rely on other agencies and organizations for infor-
mation during investigations."s The effectiveness of investigations
would be impaired if prosecutors indiscriminately wrote books, as-
sisted in movie productions, or otherwise publicly disclosed investiga-
tion secrets."a Police and other cooperating offices would become
suspicious of prosecutors. Individuals who gather evidence or do in-
vestigatory footwork may not be as apt to share their "hunches" with
the prosecutor. A strained relationship between the necessary players
in law enforcement ultimately works against the public interest. A
prosecutor's duty of confidentiality reassures cooperating offices that
the prosecutor can be trusted and will remain loyal to the pursuit of
justice above all else.
C. The Public Interest in Prosecutorial Disclosures for Literary or
Media Purposes
The functions served by confidentiality must be balanced against
the public's interest in knowing how officials perform their tasks. The
public interest in understanding how its government and representa-
tives operate is a basic tenet of our democracy. As James Madison
declared: "A popular Government, without popular information, or
the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or,
perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance: And a peo-
ple who mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves with
the power which knowledge gives." 184 The New York State Commis-
sion on Government Integrity similarly commented:
DEMOCRACY DEMANDS PUBLIC PARTICIPATION in public
issues.... Back-room decision making lends itself too readily to
self-dealing and disregard of the public's interest. Private discussion
and resolution of public issues breeds cynicism; cynicism breeds ap-
182. Principally, prosecutors rely on the police. See supra note 179 and accompany-
ing text.
183. 444 U.S. at 512 ("The continued availability of... foreign sources depends
upon the CIA's ability to guarantee the security of information that might compro-
mise them and even endanger the personal safety of foreign agents."). In Snepp, a
former CIA agent published a book without first submitting it to the Agency for pre-
publication review. 1d. at 507-08. In attesting as to how the book impaired intelli-
gence operations, the Director of the CIA stated, "[W]e have had a number of
sources discontinue work with us.... We have had very strong complaints from a
number of foreign intelligence services with whom we conduct liaison, who have ques-
tioned whether they should continue exchanging information with us, for fear it will
not remain secret." Id. at 512.
184. Letter from James Madison to W. T. Barry (August 4, 1822), in 9 The Writings
Of James Madison, 1819-1836, at 103 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910); see also Thomas I.
Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 Wash. U. L.Q. 1, 14 (1976)
("The public, as sovereign, must have all information available in order to instruct its
servants, the government.").
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athy; both undermine the accountability of elected officials and
erode confidence in the integrity of government.' 85
In adopting a "broad philosophy of 'freedom of information' "186 by
expanding public access to government documents, the United States
Senate declared that "an informed electorate is vital to the proper
operation of a democracy."'"
Yet, the people, by granting to prosecutors "the authority to seek a
just result in their name,' 88 implicitly consent to the withholding of
certain information from the public domain where the release of in-
formation would hinder the prosecutorial function.' 89 Recognizing
both the need for confidentiality and the public's right to know, the
United States Senate placed certain limits on its policy of "freedom of
information" and observed that "[i]t is also necessary for the very op-
eration of our Government to allow it to keep confidential certain
material."' 90 When the government function outweighs the public's
right to be informed, a policy of confidentiality is preferable.' 91
A chief prosecutor confronted with an assistant prosecutor's re-
quest to write a book about a case must carefully balance the office's
need for confidentiality against the public's interest in understanding
how their representatives operate. The public is the client of the pros-
ecutor, 192 and it is the public to whom the prosecutor, as a public offi-
cial, is ultimately responsible. Thus, the prosecutor has some duty to
inform the public about the function of the office with regard to crimi-
nal prosecutions. 93 Literary or media works about cases enhance
185. Government Ethics Reform For the 1990s: The Collected Reports of the New
York State Commission on Government Integrity 320-21 (Bruce A. Green ed., 1991).
186. S. Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965).
187. Id
188. Corrigan, supra note 61, at 539.
189. Other public officials who have authority to act the public's name have certain
needs for confidentiality in order to effectively serve the public. For example, the
president of the United States possesses a "generalized interest in confidentiality...
to the extent this interest relates to the effective discharge of a President's powers."
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 711 (1974). In addition, under the FOIA, fed-
eral agencies may keep information secret to effectively serve the public. See supra
notes 150-53 and accompanying text.
190. S. Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965).
191. See Fredrick Downey Palmer, Arizona Fair Trial-Free Press Dilemma at the
Preliminary Hearing Stage, 9 Ariz. L. Rev. 466, 471 (1968) ("[W]hen the policy com-
pelling secrecy is deemed sufficient, the public's right to know is not of paramount
importance.").
192. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
193. See National College of District Attorneys, The Prosecutor in America 4 (John
Jay Douglass ed., 1977) (stating that the prosecutor "has a responsibility to advise the
press and the public of the status of the criminal justice system"); Hazel B. Kerper,
Introduction To The Criminal Justice System, in The Prosecutor in America 79, 81
(John Jay Douglass ed., 1977) ("Prosecutors... have many public relations duties.");
Matheson, supra note 2, at 888 ("[I]t is generally accepted that elected prosecutors
have an obligation to inform the community about the functioning of their offices.").
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awareness of the prosecutor's function. While others outside the pros-
ecutor's office might attempt to chronicle a high-profile prosecution,
The prosecutor can be the best source of information concerning a
criminal investigation and prosecution. He has access to the gov-
ernment's evidence, including witnesses. He is trained and exper-
ienced in explaining the steps in the process and putting issues in
context.... The prosecutor interacts with law enforcement person-
nel, judges, court employees, defense counsel, corrections officials,
social service agencies, and interested citizens. These contacts put
the prosecutor in a unique position to comment on the case.19
Accordingly, the prosecutor's perspective about a case is invaluable to
ensuring an adequately informed public.
In addition to the people's general democratic interest in knowing
how their representatives perform their public duties, there is a public
interest in publications by prosecutors because of the historical value
of such works. For example, a prosecutor who decided to aid in pro-
ducing a literary or media work on Watergate, the Rosenberg trial, or
the Scopes trial would certainly have added to the historical record.1 95
A National Law Journal editorial even stated that with respect to the
ethics rule of confidentiality, "[T]he legal system ought to recognize
the value of history. Amending the ethics code to accommodate his-
tory is an idea whose time has come."' 96
While the confidentiality rules operate at odds with the public inter-
est in knowing how government investigations and prosecutions oper-
ate and in adding to the historical record through books by
prosecutors, the special needs for prosecutorial confidentiality may
disappear over time in a given case. For instance, the effect of disclo-
sure on pending investigations or prosecutions may be inconsequen-
tial once a case is closed. Law enforcement strategies may become
outdated to the point that revealing tactics used in the case at issue
will not cause many of the previously discussed problems."9 Further,
the subject matter of a book or media production may not even impli-
cate confidentiality concerns relating to candid office discussions, con-
fidential informants, or preserving the trust of law enforcement
agencies. In such instances, the public interest in disclosure may out-
weigh the policies compelling confidentiality by prosecutors. The in-
dividual who decides whether to waive the prosecutor's duty of
confidentiality must be guided by the purposes of confidentiality and
194. Matheson, supra note 2, at 890 (footnotes omitted).
195. One commentator noted that "[t]he interest of society in obtaining new infor-
mation for the reinterpretation and analysis of history is great, and lawyers, more than
any other group, have played an important role in forming and shaping history
through their involvement in events and with persons in the forefront of historical
movements." Bonnie Hobbs, Note, Lawyers' Papers: Confidentiality Versus The
Claims of History, 49 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 179, 211 (1992).
196. History v. Ethics, Nat'l L. J., July 4, 1988, at 12.
197. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
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their importance, in light of the timing of the request and the subject
matter of the proposed literary or media work. Those considerations
must then be balanced against the public interest in disclosure, be-
cause the public is the client and any final decision must be made with
its best interests in mind.
IV. A PROPOSED ETHICS STANDARD TO GOVERN PROSECUTORIAL
DISCLOSURES FOR LITERARY OR MEDIA PURPOSES
There is no ethical standard governing prosecutorial disclosures for
media or literary agreements other than a prohibition against prosecu-
tors entering such agreements "prior to [the] conclusion of all aspects
of a matter."'198 A standard is necessary to provide guidance as to who
may waive the prosecutor's duty of confidentiality and what factors
that individual should consider when confronted with a request'for a
waiver.199 Balancing the unique purposes served by the prosecutor's
duty of confidentiality against the value of such a disclosure to the
public interest in knowing how the office functions is central to such a
standard. This part proposes a ethics standard to address these con-
cerns and demonstrates its application.
A. The Proposed Ethics Standard
Because the ABA Prosecution Standards contain specific ethics
guidelines for prosecutors, which "are intended to be used as a guide
to professional conduct and performance" 200 for the unique dilemmas
that confront prosecutors, this Note proposes to include the following
rule within those Standards. The text of the proposed standard
provides:
(a) An assistant prosecutor, or any former prosecutor, who
wishes to disclose for literary or media purposes information
learned in the course of representation should obtain consent for
such a disclosure from the current chief prosecutor of the office or
department.
(b) An elected prosecutor who is the head of an office or depart-
ment and wishes to disclose information learned in the course of
representation for literary or media purposes should delegate the
198. ABA Prosecution Standards, supra note 14, Standard 3-2.11; see also Model
Rules, supra note 3, Rule 1.8(d) (forbidding a lawyer from acquiring literary or media
rights to an account based upon information learned in the course of representation
prior to the conclusion of the representation); Code, supra note 4, DR 5-104(B)
(same).
199. There are other ethics standards that provide guidance to prosecutors in other
contexts and call for consideration of certain factors to help guide these decisions.
For example, Standard 3-3.9 of the ABA Prosecution Standards lists seven factors a
prosecutor should consider in exercising his discretion in the charging decision. ABA
Prosecution Standards, supra note 14, Standard 3-3.9.
200. ld. Standard 3-1.1.
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decision to disclose to an independent attorney who will objectively
decide if a waiver of the duty of confidentiality is appropriate.
(c) An appointed prosecutor, who is head of an office or depart-
ment and wishes to disclose information learned in the course of
representation for literary or media purposes, should turn to the in-
dividual(s) who appointed him for a objective decision as to
whether disclosure is appropriate.
(d) The individual responsible for deciding whether waiving the
prosecutor's duty of confidentiality is in the public interest should
consider the subject matter of the proposed disclosure in light of the
following factors, which are not exclusive, in the totality of
circumstances:
(i) the possible effects of the disclosure on any pending
investigations;
(ii) the possible effects of the disclosure on any pending
litigation;
(iii) any possible chilling effects of the disclosure on confiden-
tial informants;
(iv) whether the disclosure may compromise law enforcement
strategies and thus allow easier circumvention of the law;
(v) whether the disclosure may endanger the lives, physical
safety, or reputations of others;
(vi) any possible chilling effects from the disclosure on candid
office discussions;
(vii) the effects of such disclosure on the relationship be-
tween the prosecutor's office and other law enforcement agencies;
(viii) the public interest in the disclosure; and
(ix) the appropriateness of a partial waiver.
This proposed standard provides a process by which consent can be
obtained for prosecutorial disclosures relating to literary and media
works. Presently, there is no such process. The proposed rule also
gives decision makers needed guidance to ensure that an appropriate
decision is made on a case-by-case basis, noting the varying impor-
tance of each factor in different circumstances. The proposed rule ac-
counts for the timing of the request, the unique aspects of the request,
and the purpose of the request.
The standard also accounts for the interests served by confidential-
ity in several respects. First, it minimizes the incentive for prosecutors
to conduct cases with an eye toward maximizing the marketability of
the subject matter for future book and movie contracts.20 1 The fact
that a prosecutor knows prior to litigation that such a decision will
appropriately be made by an individual removed from the situation
and that certain delineated factors are considered make clear that it
will be difficult to get a waiver for a substantial length of time after the
matter is concluded, if at all. Second, the standard ensures that each
201. See discussion supra part ILA.
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function of confidentiality receives individual consideration before
any waiver is given. Third, the rule allows for partial waivers." Thus,
a prosecutor may receive permission to disclose only information that
does not relate to informants, investigative tactics, or certain office
discussions. Such flexibility will preserve confidentiality in certain
matters while recognizing the public interest in knowing about other
aspects of a case. The discretion given to the decision maker in this
proposed standard mirrors the discretion afforded to prosecutors for
many other decisions: charging decisions, °3 plea negotiations,2 4 and
sentencing recommendations. 5
B. Application of the Proposed Ethics Standard
The following hypotheticals demonstrate how the proposed stan-
dard is be applied:
1. An assistant United States Attorney recently worked on the suc-
cessful prosecution of several organized crime figures. He has re-
ceived some offers to write a book about his role and cooperate in the
movie production of his character. He requests permission to disclose
one year after the convictions.
In this first hypothetical, the request would be made to the head of
the department-the attorney general.2 6 The attorney general would
then conduct an inquiry, applying the listed factors to determine if
disclosure is appropriate at that time.20 7 Because that case involved
202. Partial waivers of the prosecutor's duty of confidentiality should be considered
carefully. Some district courts have held that "clients who partially disclose privileged
communications for their own benefit have waived privilege protection for all related
communications." Theodore Harman, Note, Fairness and the Doctrine of Subject Mat-
ter Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege In Extrajudicial Disclosure Situations, 1988
U. Il. L. Rev. 999, 1009 (citing United States v. Cote, 456 F.2d 142, 144-45 (8th Cir.
1972); Nye v. Sage Prods. Inc., 98 F.R.D. 452, 453 (N.D. IM. 1982); Handgards, Inc. v.
Johnson & Johnson, 413 F. Supp. 926, 929 (N.D. Cal. 1976)). Harman pointed out
that the reasoning for this is that "[c]ourts do not allow the client to pick and choose
among privileged communications, disclosing the favorable communications while
protecting the unfavorable communications." Id. However, "when the selective dis-
closure is not made to the trier of fact, the unfairness is much harder to find." Id. at
1009-10.
203. ABA Prosecution Standards, supra note 14, Standard 3-3.9 (listing factors a
prosecutor should consider in deciding whether to charge).
204. Id. Standard 3-4.1 (discussing how prosecutors should conduct plea
discussions).
205. Id. Standard 3-6.1 (discussing the prosecutor's role in the sentencing process
and in offering a sentencing recommendation).
206. Most likely, the attorney general will delegate the decision to the United
States Attorney in that district. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
207. A chief prosecutor confronted with a request for a waiver of confidentiality is
still subject to the ethics rules pertaining to conflict of interest. Because the chief
prosecutor must be an impartial decision maker who acts only for the public interest,
if he had a role in the issue at hand or has a strong personal interest in the waiver
decision, he must disqualify himself from making the decision on a waiver. See Code,
supra note 4, EC 5-1 ("The professional judgment of a lawyer should be exercised,
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organized crime figures, informants may have played a significant role
in the prosecution. If informants did provide information crucial to
apprehending the organized crime figures, any disclosures about what
was said or how they met with prosecutors may put lives in danger and
deter others from becoming informants. Additionally, death threats
may have been sent to the prosecutors on a regular basis. This would
be a heavily weighted factor in the decision because the disclosure of
office discussions so soon after a case, where participants' lives may be
endangered, could cause future exchanges in similar cases to be chil-
led. The role of unique investigative tactics also may be a factor. New
strategies may have been developed to combat organized crime, and if
they are exposed, circumvention of the law may be easier. Finally, a
disclosure so soon after the convictions may prejudice other pending
cases or investigations involving organized crime figures. Further, the
appeal process may have just begun and a disclosure could jeopardize
the fairness both of that process and of habeas corpus. Balancing all
of these justifications for maintaining confidentiality against the public
interest in knowing weighs against granting a waiver of confidentiality
in this scenario.
2. A former district attorney wishes to write a book about the twenty
years during which she held office and the various issues she encoun-
tered. Three years after she left office, this former district attorney
requests a waiver of confidentiality from the current district attorney.
In this situation, the request would properly be made to the current
district attorney because he has the present authority of the people to
set office policy on their behalf. Because the book's subject matter
deals with the memoirs of the former district attorney and some issues
may still be fairly recent, the current district attorney should be cer-
tain that there are no disclosures in areas that may affect pending in-
vestigations or prosecutions. Weight should be given to the fact that
the book will span the former prosecutor's entire career with the of-
fice and some cases that will be discussed may be years old. Because
the book would deal with numerous cases over a lengthy period of
time, there would probably be little concern that candid office discus-
sions may be chilled by the disclosures, because little detail would be
given to such discussions. In addition, many prosecution and law en-
forcement strategies may be outdated by the time the book is written.
Strong consideration also would be given to the historical value of the
book, which would discuss prosecutorial changes over a period of time
in terms of cases, tactics, and politics. The book also would add to the
public's understanding of the district attorney's office. Weighing all of
the factors, a partial waiver seems appropriate with the condition that
within the bounds of the law, solely for the benefit of his client and free of compro-
mising influences and loyalties." (footnote omitted)); see also supra notes 126-32 and
accompanying text.
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informants, current law enforcement strategies, and any pending mat-
ters are not discussed.
3. The head of the sex crimes unit in an metropolitan district attor-
ney's office wishes to write a book on date-rape prosecutions, based
upon his experiences in the unit. He requests the consent of the dis-
trict attorney to write the book while he is still head of the unit.
This hypothetical is a waiver request on an issue that is the subject
of much debate and of which there is a great deal of public interest.
The book would not focus on any individual prosecution, but rather
would discuss how the office investigates and prosecutes date-rape
complaints. Because the focus is not on a particular case, the risk of
chilling office discussions, deterring the cooperation of future infor-
mants, and damaging the reputations of innocent parties are not is-
sues. There would be a strong public interest in the disclosure
because it would enhance understanding of the office and how it han-
dles a sensitive issue in the criminal justice system. A waiver is appro-
priate in this case because of the strong public interest and minimal
confidentiality concerns.
CONCLUSION
Literary and media works about prosecutions can educate the pub-
lic about the legal system and can add to the historical record. When
a prosecutor involved in a depicted case discloses prosecutorial infor-
mation, it is particularly valuable to the public-the prosecutor's cli-
ent. Prosecutors have a unique first-hand perspective about a case,
can offer inside information unobtainable from other sources, and are
able to provide invaluable insights into the criminal justice system.
But like any other attorney, the prosecutor must abide by the ethical
duty of confidentiality and obtain permission before making such dis-
closures, to prevent conflicts of interest and frustration of the prosecu-
tion function. While other attorneys can obtain client waivers to
release them from the ethical duty of confidentiality, prosecutors are
in a difficult position because their client is the public. Present ethics
rules are devoid of advice as to a prosecutor's duty of confidentiality
and under what circumstances a prosecutor may disclose prosecutorial
information for books and movies on publicized cases.
This Note has proposed an ethical standard and a process by which
a prosecutor may obtain office permission to disclose prosecutorial
confidences for media and literary purposes. The proposed standard
specifies who should decide if such a disclosure is appropriate and re-
quires the decision maker to balance the unique purposes served by
the prosecutor's duty of confidentiality, as well as public interest in
knowing how prosecutors perform their tasks. The standard provides
the decision maker with the needed flexibility to address specific dis-
closure requests. Adoption of the proposed standard will offer the
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necessary guidance in an area where ethics rules are silent, recognize
the value of prosecutorial disclosures for literary or media works, and
minimize the potential for frustration and private exploitation of the
prosecution function by inappropriate disclosures.

